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Virtues as Skills, and The Virtues of Self-Regulation

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Notes

  1. See for example: Annas, Julia, Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Sosa, Ernest, A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Stichter, Matt, “Virtue as Skill”, in Nancy Snow (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Virtue (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

  2. Annas, Julia, “Virtue as a Skill,” International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 3 (1995), 227–243, 229.

  3. Control theory, or cybernetics, has long studied the processes involved with goal-oriented systems, including in machines and in animals (as goals can be the result of programming or instinct, as well as choice). The basic stages to any form of regulation involve having: (1) a goal; (2) a representation of the current state affairs; (3) a way to compare (1) and (2) to see if the goal is currently being met; and (4) if the goal is not being met, there is an action the system can take to bring the current state of affairs closer to the goal (and the system must also repeat stages [2] and [3] to know when the goal has been achieved). Of course, those are just the most basic elements of a goal-directed system, and more complex goals and systems will add additional layers of processes to this initial picture. See Carver, Charles and Scheier, Michael (1998). On the self-regulation of behavior (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

  4. Bandura, Albert, "Social Cognitive Theory of Personality", in Pervin, Lawrence A. and John, Oliver P. (eds.) Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research (New York: The Guilford Press, 1990), 154-196.

  5. See Dweck, Carol S. and Leggett, Ellen L. “A Social-Cognitive Approach to Motivation and Personality”, Psychological Review, 95:2 (1988), 256-273.

  6. See Carver, Charles S. and Scheier, Michael F., "Self-Regulatory Perspectives on Personality", in Millon, Theodore and Lerner, Melvin J. (eds.) Handbook of Psychology: Volume 5 Personality and Social Psychology (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2003), 185-208, 189.

  7. Though some theorists suggest a different relationship, such as Rosalind Hursthouse who argues that virtues are the “best bet” for achieving Eudaimonia. My thanks to a reviewer for pointing this out.

  8. See Achtziger, A., & Gollwitzer, P. M., “Motivation and volition in the course of action”, in J. Heckhausen & H. Heckhausen (Eds.), Motivation and action (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 202–226.

  9. Heckhausen, Jutta, “The Motivation-Volition Divide and Its Resolution in Action-Phase Models of Developmental Regulation”, Research in Human Development, 4:3–4 (2007), 163–180, 168.

  10. Here ‘self-control’ means narrowly just staying focused on the goal once is currently striving for, and resisting temptations to pursue some less valued goal instead. So ‘self-control’ is one part of self-regulation more broadly.

  11. See Duckworth, Angela and Gross, James J., "Self-Control and Grit: Related but Separable Determinants of Success", Current Directions in Psychological Science, 23:5 (2014), 319–325.

  12. As such, my view is similar to that of Ellen Fridland, as she claims that “skills as the subclass of abilities, which are characterized by the fact that they are refined or developed as a result of effortful attention and control to the skill itself.” Fridland, Ellen, "Skill Learning and Conceptual Thought: Making a Way through the Wilderness", in Bashour, B. and Muller, H. (eds.) Philosophical Naturalism and its Implications (Routledge, 2014).

  13. See Horn, John and Masunaga, Hiromi, “A Merging Theory of Expertise and Intelligence”, in K. Anders Ericsson (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 587-612, 601.

  14. While my account of virtue as a skill differs in some important respects from her account, on this point we are in agreement.

  15. Annas, Julia, Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 18.

  16. Annas, Julia, Intelligent Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 25.

  17. Krampe, Ralf Th., and Charness, Neil, “Aging and Expertise”, in K. Anders Ericsson (ed.) The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 723-742.

  18. Fridland, Ellen, "They’ve lost control: reflections on skill", Synthese, 191 (2014), 2729–2750, 2740.

  19. See Kahneman, Daniel, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011), 241.

  20. See Annas, Julia, “The Structure of Virtue”, in DePaul, Michael and Zagzebski, Linda (eds.) Intellectual Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 15-33, 26.

  21. Narvaez, Darcia, “De neurobiology van ons morel functioneren [The neurobiology of moral formation and moral functioning]”, Pastorale perspectieven 153:4 (2011), 10-18.

  22. See Narvaez, Darcia and Lapsley, Daniel, “The psychological foundations of everyday morality and moral expertise”, in Daniel K. Lapsley and F. Clark Power (eds.) Character Psychology and Character Education (Notre Dame: IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 140-165, 155.

  23. This kind of approach is similar to Daniel Russell’s view of the cardinality of virtues. He thinks of broad virtues, like generosity, as having related fine-grained virtues. See Russell, Daniel C., Practical Intelligence and the Virtues (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 195.

  24. See Duckworth, Angela Lee and Tsukayama, Eli, “Domain Specificity in Self-Control”, in Miller, Christian B., Furr, R. Michael, Knobel, Angela, and Fleeson, William (eds.) Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology (Oxford University Press, 2015), 393-411.

  25. Duckworth, Angela Lee and Tsukayama, Eli, “Domain Specificity in Self-Control”, in Miller, Christian B., Furr, R. Michael, Knobel, Angela, and Fleeson, William (eds.) Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology (Oxford University Press, 2015), 393-411, 400.

  26. See Gollwitzer, Peter M., "Implementation Intentions: Strong Effects of Simple Plans", American Psychologist, 54:7 (1999), 493-503.

  27. Brandstätter, Veronika, Jonas, Kai J., Koletzko, Svenja H., Fischer, Peter, “Self-Regulatory Processes in the Appraisal of Moral Courage Situations”, Social Psychology (2016), 47(4), 201–213, 203.

  28. Brandstätter, Veronika, Jonas, Kai J., Koletzko, Svenja H., Fischer, Peter, “Self-Regulatory Processes in the Appraisal of Moral Courage Situations”, Social Psychology (2016), 47(4), 201–213, 204.

  29. See Wolf, Susan, “Moral Psychology and the Unity of the Virtues”, Ratio 20:2 (2007), 145-167.

  30. See Badhwar, Neera K., “The Limited Unity of Virtue”, Noûs, 30: 3 (1996), 306-329.

  31. Badhwar, Neera K., “The Limited Unity of Virtue”, Noûs, 30: 3 (1996), 306-329, 307.

  32. Badhwar, Neera K., “The Limited Unity of Virtue”, Noûs, 30: 3 (1996), 306-329, 308.

  33. Duckworth, Angela Lee and Tsukayama, Eli, “Domain Specificity in Self-Control”, in Miller, Christian B., Furr, R. Michael, Knobel, Angela, and Fleeson, William (eds.) Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology (Oxford University Press, 2015), 393-411, 397.

  34. See Stichter, Matt, “Practical Skills and Practical Wisdom in Virtue”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94:3 (2016): 435-448.

  35. This conclusion is also suggested by Russell’s own critique of Badhwar. See Russell, Daniel C., Practical Intelligence and the Virtues (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 364-370.

  36. Duckworth, Angela Lee and Tsukayama, Eli, “Domain Specificity in Self-Control”, in Miller, Christian B., Furr, R. Michael, Knobel, Angela, and Fleeson, William (eds.) Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology (Oxford University Press, 2015), 393-411, 398.

  37. See Roberts, Bob, “Will Power and the Virtues”, The Philosophical Review 93:2 (1984), 227-247.

  38. See Roberts, Bob, “Will Power and the Virtues”, The Philosophical Review 93:2 (1984), 227-247.

  39. Baumeister, Roy F. and Vohs, Kathleen D., “Self-Regulation [Self-Control]”, in Peterson, Christopher and Seligman, Martin (eds.) Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification (Oxford University Press, 2004), 499-516, 508.

  40. See also Steutel, Jan, “The virtues of will-power: self-control and deliberation”, in: David Carr and Jan Steutel (eds), Virtue Ethics and Moral Education (London and New York, Routledge, 1999).

  41. Roberts, Bob, “Will Power and the Virtues”, The Philosophical Review 93:2 (1984), 227-247, 238.

  42. See Tessman, Lisa. Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (Oxford University Press, 2005).

  43. “Wise reflection” comes from Valerie Tiberius, and is a form of reflection that helps us solve questions of value in an appropriate way. Tiberius, Valerie. “In Defense of Reflection”, Philosophical Issues, 23: Epistemic Agency (2013), 232-243.

  44. See Kawall, Jason. “Other–Regarding Epistemic Virtues”, Ratio, Vol. 15: 3 (2002), 257–275.

  45. See Battaly, Heather. “Epistemic Self-Indulgence”, Metaphilosophy, Vol. 41: 1/2, Special Issue: Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic (2010), 214-234.

  46. See Sosa, Ernest, “Virtue Epistemology: Character Versus Competence”, in Mark Alfano (ed.), Current Controversies in Virtue Theory (Routledge, 2015), 62-73.

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Stichter, M. Virtues as Skills, and The Virtues of Self-Regulation. J Value Inquiry 55, 355–369 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-021-09820-2

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