Abstract
Here is a new version of the Evidential Problem of Evil.Theists claim that it is reasonable for atheists to believethat if God did exist, suffering would look just as it does now. I endorse this claim, however it cannot be deployedagainst my argument without the following epistemic principle:what we see makes p likely only if it is reasonable tobelieve it would be discernibly different if p were false. I demonstrate that this principle is mistaken. The paperalso responds to objections from Alvin Plantinga and PeterVan Inwagen that God’s existence is compatible with pointlessnatural evil. In particular, I argue that appeals to vaguenessdo not support the compatibility claim.
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Stone, J. Evidential Atheism. Philosophical Studies 114, 253–277 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024940515305
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024940515305