Abstract
As object-directed emotions, reactive attitudes can be appropriate in the sense of fitting, where an emotion is fitting in virtue of accurately representing its target. I use this idea to argue for a theory of moral accountability: an agent S is accountable for an action A if and only if A expresses S’s quality of will and S has the capacity to recognize and respond to moral reasons. For the sake of argument, I assume that a reactive attitude is fitting if and only if its constituent thoughts are true, and I argue for the above theory by determining thoughts partly constituting resentment and gratitude. Although others have argued that the capacity to recognize and respond to moral reasons is necessary for accountability, the argument here is significantly better in two respects. First, it does not rely on intermediary ethical principles, supplementary arguments, or assumptions about the nature of reactive attitudes specifically. Instead, it simply assumes that reactive attitudes, like all emotions, have cognitive content. Second, the argument here is more powerful because it brings to light the quality of will condition and has the resources to flesh out the capacity to recognize and respond to moral reasons.
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Notes
Thus, to use the biconditional, I set aside actions for which an accountable agent might be neither blameworthy nor praiseworthy, such as merely doing one’s duty. In adopting the biconditional, I do not assume that reactive attitudes are the only way to hold agents accountable. Further, I mean “blameworthy” and “praiseworthy” in the accountability sense of moral responsibility, since agents can be blameworthy and praiseworthy in the attributability sense of responsibility too. I discuss attributability below.
Strawson (1962/2003) famously argues that being an accountable agent is a matter of being an appropriate target of reactive attitudes, and many have agreed, including Wallace (1994) and Rosen (2015). My argument does not depend upon this idea. Even if being accountable explains the appropriateness of reactive attitudes, we can recognize than an agent is not accountable for an action by recognizing that she is not the appropriate target of reactive attitudes for it.
In cases of misleading evidence, an emotion’s evaluative presentation may be unfitting but yet justified. Although there is a sense in which an emotion is appropriate in virtue of being justified, I set aside this sense. I thank Nathan Ballantyne for raising this issue.
I thank Brian Ballard for very helpful discussion.
Rosen (2015) adopts the True-Thoughts View, but he calls it the “Alethic View” and takes it to be an alternative to fittingness views. I diverge from his terminology to highlight both that the True-Thoughts View is a view of fittingness on my understanding and that my argument would go through equally well with any view of fittingness.
I thank an anonymous referee for this example and for asking me to address what is gained by working with reactive attitudes to find the accountability conditions.
Note that reactive attitudes are partially constituted by thoughts representing the accountability conditions no matter which side of our original biconditional explains the other. (Recall our original biconditional: an agent is accountable for an action if and only if reactive attitudes are appropriate toward her on account of it.) Hence reactive attitudes are specially suited to illuminate the accountability conditions even if being accountable explains the appropriateness of reactive attitudes. You might worry that, if being accountable explains the appropriateness of reactive attitudes, then the thoughts partially constituting reactive attitudes could misidentify the accountability conditions. We can set this skeptical worry aside. Even if being accountable explains the appropriateness of reactive attitudes, our practice of holding people accountable—of which reactive attitudes are an integral part—is the best evidence that we have of the nature of accountability. Plus, at the very least, the representational content of reactive attitudes tells us what we take the correct accountability conditions to be. The onus would then be on the skeptic to demonstrate that our practice has gotten it wrong.
You may object that gratitude is sometimes appropriate when an agent expresses mere sufficient good will, such as when the stakes are high or doing the right thing is costly. In these cases, I think that doing the right thing likely requires more than sufficient good will. Yet, I need not decide this issue. Even if gratitude is sometimes appropriate toward someone who expresses mere sufficient good will, the conclusion that I draw still stands.
Here I follow Watson (1996/2004), who first distinguished attributability and accountability. Watson claims that attributable actions are those actions that express an agent’s practical identity. I focus more narrowly on an agent’s moral identity because we are discussing moral responsibility.
Arpaly (2003, p. 79) also makes this point.
You may wonder whether being moved by a moral consideration de dicto, such as being moved to perform an action by the fact that it is morally obligatory, may sometimes express good will. I think that it may, so long as this happens because of an underlying recognition of a moral consideration de re. For example, you may be moved to perform an action by the fact that it is obligatory because you recognize (perhaps unconsciously) that, say, in performing obligatory actions, you treat others well or respectfully. I thank Justin Coates for raising this issue.
I thank John Mackay for this suggestion.
Even if the reasons here are grounded in personal relationships rather than morality, such cases would still show that the thought “he could have done better” partly constitutes resentment, and this thought would still support the idea that, to be accountable, an agent must have the capacity to recognize and respond to certain reasons: moral reasons for moral accountability and reasons deriving from personal relationships for accountability within those relationships.
I thank Sarah Buss for pressing this worry.
Rosen (2004) makes this distinction, using the terms “original responsibility” and “derivative responsibility.”
What makes him derivatively accountable for smashing your car window? Presumably it matters that he could foresee that he would act badly while drunk, but I need not determine here what makes agents derivatively accountable. All that matters here is having a clear case of derivative accountability.
Watson (1987/2004, p. 231).
Watson (1987/2004, p. 229).
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Acknowledgements
I thank Nathan Ballantyne, Lara Buchak, Sarah Buss, Gideon Rosen, Michael Smith, and anonymous referees for very helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper. I also thank the participants of the following workshops for valuable comments and questions: the Moral Responsibility Workshop at Rutgers University (2017), the Speculative Ethics Forum at St. John’s University (2015), and the 2013–14 New York City Early Career Ethics Workshop.
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Strabbing, J.T. Accountability and the thoughts in reactive attitudes. Philos Stud 176, 3121–3140 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1166-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1166-8