Abstract
In his fetishist argument, Michael Smith raises an important question: What is the content of the motivational states that constitute moral motivation? Although the argument has been widely discussed, this question has not received the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I use Smith’s argument as a point of departure for a discussion of how advocates of externalism as regards moral judgements can account for moral motivation. More precisely, I explore various explanations of moral motivation that externalists can employ to answer the question Smith poses.
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Notes
Henceforth, when referring to rightness I intend moral rightness and when referring to moral judgements I intend self-addressed moral judgements of the kind just mentioned.
It should be mentioned that Smith advocates a weaker version of internalism than the one I am concerned with here: “If an agent judges that it is right for her to ϕ in circumstances C, then either she is motivated to ϕ in C or she is practically irrational” (Smith, M. (1994). The moral problem. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 61). However, he believes that the fetishist argument provides support to both versions of internalism. (See e.g. Smith, op. cit., p. 72.)
Smith, op. cit., p. 71. Smith has presented somewhat different versions of the argument. Here I follow mainly Smith’s original formulation of it (Smith, op. cit., pp. 71–76), but see also Smith, M. (1996). The argument for internalism: Reply to Miller. Analysis, 56, 175–184, and Smith, M. (1997), In defence of The moral problem: A reply to Brink, Copp and Sayre-McCord. Ethics, 108, 111–117. My understanding of the argument has gained from some of the comments it has given rise to: Brink, D. (1997). Moral motivation, Ethics, 108, 26–29; Copp, D. (1997), Belief, reason, and motivation: Michael Smith’s The moral problem. Ethics, 108, 49–50; Cuneo, T. (1999), An externalist solution to the ‘moral problem.’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59, 359–380; Dreier, J. (2000). Dispositions and fetishes: Externalist models of moral motivation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61, 619–638; Lillehammer, H. (1997). Smith on moral fetishism. Analysis, 57, 187–195; Miller, A. (1996). An objection to Smith’s argument for internalism. Analysis, 56, 169–174; Miller, A. (2003). An introduction to contemporary metaethics. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 225–227; Olson, J. (2002). Are desires de dicto fetishistic? Inquiry, 45, 89–96; Sadler, B. (2003). The possibility of amoralism: A defence against internalism. Philosophy, 78, 63–78; Shafer-Landau, R. (1998). Moral judgment and moral motivation. The Philosophical Quarterly, 48, 353–358; Svavarsdóttir, S. (1999). Moral cognitivism and motivation. The Philosophical Review, 108, 194–215; Toppinen, T. (2004). Moral fetishism revisited. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 94, 305–313, and Zangwill, N. (2003). Externalist moral motivation. American Philosophical Quarterly, 40, 146–148.
The reference to desires here should not be taken to imply that internalists or externalists are committed to the Humean theory of motivation. The relevant motivational states might consist in beliefs or in desires that are generated by beliefs. However, here I will adhere to Smith’s terminology.
Of course, she might still be motivated to perform the action but in that case this is due to a motivational state that is not related to her moral judgement.
To see an example of how this might be possible, consider a version of non-cognitivism. According to this view, a person’s moral judgement to the effect that an action is right consists in her having a non-cognitive state in the form of a certain kind of desire to perform the action in question. She has this desire, we might assume, because she has a desire of that kind to perform actions which have certain features, and she believes that the action in question has these features. Such a moral judgement is sufficient for her to be accordingly motivated. On this view, her moral judgement does not need to involve the concept of rightness for her to be morally motivated. In other words, she does not have to be motivated by a desire de dicto, but might be motivated by a desire de re, to do what she judges to be right. For Smith’s cognitivist account of how a good and strong-willed person can be motivated by a desire de re, see e.g. “In defense of The Moral Problem,” p. 114. Alexander Miller argues that this account fails, in which case Smith’s own view does not escape the fetishist argument. (See Miller, An introduction to contemporary metaethics, pp. 225–227.)
According to externalism as I understand it, a moral judgement is never sufficient for moral motivation; an external motivational state is always required in order for a person to be motivated to do what she judges to be right. Since it is the need for an external motivational state that is thought to be problematic for externalism, I do not beg any questions by understanding the view in this way.
Smith, The moral problem, p. 75.
I use the phrase ‘make actions right’ in the established but vague sense that is common in meta-ethics. How the right-making relation is to be understood exactly is presumably determined by the meta-ethical theory at issue. Suppose a meta-ethical view claims that rightness supervenes on, but is not identical to, a certain set of features. On this view, what makes actions right might consist in (some of) these features. This is perhaps the most straightforward sense in which it might be thought that features make actions right. However, there are perhaps other ways in which this relation might hold. To illustrate, we might take the following examples. Consider a version of analytical reductionism which states that an action being right consists in an ideal observer wanting to see it performed. On this view, what makes actions right might consist in the features that the ideal observer wants actions to have. (The fact that she wants actions to have these features explains, in combination with her belief that a certain action has these features, why she wants to see this action performed.) Consider next a version of synthetic reductionism which states that an action being right consists in it having a certain natural property, such as maximising happiness. On this view, what makes actions right might consist in this property or certain features that instate it in particular situations. It should be observed, however, that even if it is a meta-ethical theory which determines what the right-making relation consists in, it is presumably a normative theory which determines what the features are that make actions right. These features might in turn consist in non-moral features or thick moral features. When discussing examples of such features, I do not want to commit myself to any particular meta-ethical or normative view.
As I indicated when I introduced this kind of explanation, it might be the case that a person believes that the action at issue merely has some of the features that, according to her view, make actions right. For the sake of simplicity I will take this qualification as implied in what follows.
This holds only ceteris paribus since there might be motivational states that are not related to her moral judgements but which are such that she is motivated to perform the action in question already before the change in moral judgement. In what follows, I will take the ceteris paribus clause to be implied.
Smith alludes to such cases at certain points in his argument: The moral problem, pp. 71–72; “The argument for internalism,” pp. 180–181, and “In defence of The moral problem,” p. 114.
Smith, “The argument for internalism”, pp. 176–177. In order to avoid misunderstanding, Smith has abandoned the expression ‘good and strong-willed person’ and prefers instead ‘moralist.’
It should be stressed that a substantially good and strong-willed person does not have to be consciously aware of the correct normative theory of what makes actions right. The reason why she is able to detect what features make actions right does consequently not have to be that she has theoretical knowledge of the matter, but might instead be that she possesses practical or “silent” knowledge of the appropriate kind. In relation to this, it should also be observed that normative theories might converge in a wide range of cases as to what is right. It is therefore reasonable to assume that substantially good and strong-willed persons can detect the features that make actions right even if they accept different normative theories. Moreover, this suggests that such a person might change her intellectual understanding as to what the correct normative view is, provided she is sensible to these features in the way stated above. Consequently, as long as she is a reliable detector of what these features are, there is no need to explain her moral motivation in terms of a desire de dicto to do what she judges to be right, even if she changes her intellectual understanding of what constitutes the correct normative view. Furthermore, it might be argued that people can be more or less good and strong-willed in virtue of being more or less able to detect what features make actions right and more or less motivated to perform actions that have these features.
Smith, “The argument for internalism,” p. 182. See also “In defence of The moral problem,” pp. 112–115.
Smith, The moral problem, p. 75.
Cf. Copp, “Belief, reason, and motivation,” pp. 49–50; Sadler, “The possibility of amoralism,” pp. 69–71; Svavarsdóttir, “Moral cognitivism and motivation,” pp. 202–203, and Zangwill, “Externalist moral motivation,” pp. 146–148.
Smith, op. cit., p. 74.
Cf. Shafer-Landau, “Moral judgment and moral motivation,” pp. 158–159, and Svavarsdóttir, “Moral cognitivism and motivation,” p. 202. For the distinction between backgrounding and foregrounding desires, see Pettit, P. & Smith, M. (1990). Backgrounding desire. The Philosophical Review, 99, 565–592.
See e.g. Smith, “In defence of The moral problem,” pp. 114–115.
Cf. Zangwill, op. cit., pp. 148–149.
I would like to thank the participants of various philosophical events in Lund, Linköping and Helsinki for valuable discussions of this material. I am also indebted to a number of anonymous referees (Philosophia) for valuable comments. One version of the paper appeared in Rønnow-Rasmussen, T., Petersson, B., Josefsson, J., & Egonsson, D. (2007) (Eds.) Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical papers dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, http://www.fil.lu.se/hommageawlodek. A substantial part of my work with the paper was supported by a research grant from The Bank of Sweden’s Tercentenary Foundation.
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Strandberg, C. Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation. Philosophia 35, 249–260 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9056-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9056-x