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Arpaly has a brief and rather sceptical discussion in chapter 3 of traditional virtue-ethical concepts like character and virtue; she seems to find these helpful only if they are understood in terms of depth of moral concern, the key notion in her analysis of moral praiseworthiness and blameworthiness.
Confusingly, while this paper is cited in the text as Watson (1987), it is listed in the bibliography as Watson (1993), and another paper (to which I’m not sure Arpaly ever refers) is listed as Watson (1987). There is also at least one omission from the bibliography, namely the work by Mele referred to as forthcoming on p. 136.
Gary Watson, “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme,” in his Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays (Oxford, 2004), p. 228. (See also p. 242.) I will cite subsequent page numbers in parentheses in the text.
What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA, 1998), p. 23. I will cite subsequent page numbers in parentheses in the text.
That is why I was amazed to read that Arpaly thinks Scanlon’s account of rationality fits well with her project: his account in particular, she says, is one which “would make sense if all I said so far were right” (p. 60; ch. 2, n. 23, p. 185).
Note that this is not a request for something Arpaly declines (legitimately, in my view) to provide, namely “a full account of acting for reasons” (p. 115). I am not saying we need an account of what, in general, it is to act for reasons; I am saying we need from Arpaly an account of when someone who is acting for reasons is acting for reason R in particular.
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Stroud, S. Moral worth and rationality as acting on good reasons. Philos Stud 134, 449–456 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9069-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9069-5