Abstract
This article offers an interpretation of lawyers’ reactions to verse judgments, being judicial decisions rendered in rhymed poetry form. While, in recent history, there has been an unexplained break in the close historical connection between poetry and law, some judges nevertheless continue to render their judicial decisions in verse. This has met strong criticism from fellow judges, inevitably, but also from lawyers. However, there is no evidence in academic writing of anyone attempting to explain why lawyers are having these reactions. Endeavouring to fill that void, this research employs hermeneutics to offer an interpretation of lawyers’ reactions to verse judgments. The article analyses the varied opinions uncovered in five qualitative interviews with lawyers of different backgrounds, and contends that a movement of poetry back towards its utilitarian origins would see lawyers change their reaction to verse judgments, instead viewing them as an appropriate form of judicial expression.
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Notes
This was evidenced in a brief interview with a judge of the New South Wales District Court, in which the judge referred to verse judgments as “ridiculous” and “self indulgent”, given that they felt that judicial officers perform a “serious task” and thus should not “seek plaudit for their poetry skills”.
This research is conducted with a sensitive awareness of the vastness of existing works by a range of academics in the Law and Literature Movement, however aims to avoid the two fallacies, or structural weaknesses, in that movement, mimetic and romantic, as criticised by Desmond Manderson in [27]. For a review of [27], see [35].
These interviews were conducted with [University Name] Human Research Ethics Committee approval. All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the ethical standards of the [University Name] Human Research Ethics Committee and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.
To avoid globalising the conclusions of this paper, it must be noted that the interviewees were drawn specifically from the legal profession in the Illawarra area, located on the south coast of New South Wales, Australia.
All interview participants have been given pseudonyms to ensure their anonymity.
This sentiment is echoed by Chief Justice Stephen Zappala in [50: 572] and is discussed in Part Four.
In [19: 14], Australian songwriter, Paul Kelly, describes how he left an untrue line in an otherwise completely true song because it ‘sang well’ and the alternative ‘had too many syllables to fit right’. Ultimately, Kelly warns that one ‘shouldn’t trust a songwriter’ because ‘[t]hey’ll rhyme, and murder while they rhyme’.
See [47].
[28: 31], describing the view of James Boyd White.
For the purposes of this study, ‘music’ as an extremely broad term is taken to include poetry utilising both the techniques of exact rhyme and regular rhythm.
See also [22: 351].
See also [49].
This was referring to [53]; a case in which Justice Eakin affirmed the trial court’s award of damages for injury to a miniature poodle named ‘Angel’, recalling in his verse judgment that ‘To appellee this was nothing short of an unmitigated disaster; the wingless Angel’d taken flight and ascended quickly past her’.
See [29].
This notion of immortality is summed up in the famous formulation, “The king is dead. Long live the king”.
See [17].
See [44]; a case in which Judge Deborah Servitto claimed that, by writing her judgment in rap form, she had ‘put the decision in a universally understandable format’.
See [17].
See [29].
The word “flippant” is being used here in its colloquial, plain, grammatical sense, and is not intended as a reference to the more complex theories related to the frivolity of law.
Further similarities between the views of Deloris and Richard can be realised when one considers Deloris’ objection to judges exercising “their inner bard” to “show how clever they are” and feed their “massive ego and hubris”, particularly as occurred in [51]; a case which she felt was “awful” with “no redeeming features” resulting, as Richard also put it, in the “complete objectification of the woman”.
See [17].
See [29].
This use of the word is intended to have a subtly different meaning to that given to it by the Ancient Greeks (as discussed on p 1), instead referring to a normative universe grounded in narrative, through which human communities forge shared meaning and humans themselves learn to conform themselves to the law.
See footnote 8.
Indeed, all lawyers interviewed disagreed with the claim of Kleefeld in [22: 360], that ‘judge-made law, when accompanied by or put in verse, may help the masses better understand and follow that law’.
This was demonstrated a number of times by Deloris, who was recorded in the interview as stating “I’ll probably stick to conservative”, “I’m just being conservative probably”, and “that’s my conservative response”.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to express my deep gratitude to Dr Luis Gómez Romero for his patient guidance, enthusiastic encouragement and useful critiques of this research work. His willingness to give his time so generously has been very much appreciated. He has played a major role, and continues to play a major role, in my achievements, and that is something for which I will always be grateful. I would also like to thank the five research participants for sharing their time and valuable insights. Finally, I wish to thank my family and friends for their support and encouragement throughout my study.
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Strickland, A. Poetic Justice: An Interpretation of Lawyers’ Reactions to Verse Judgments. Int J Semiot Law 29, 643–666 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-015-9451-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-015-9451-8