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Transcendental arguments and ‘epistemological naturalism’

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Notes

  1. Journal of Philosophy, Oct. 23, 1975. Page numbers alone in parentheses in the text refer to that article.

  2. Kant,Critique of Pure Reason, tr. N.K. Smith (New York 1963), A85–B117.

  3. Ibid., A737–B765.

  4. Ibid., A96–7.

  5. I have discussed some recent arguments of this sort in ‘Transcendental Arguments’,Journal of Philosophy, May 2, 1968.

  6. Strawson inThe Bounds of Sense (London, 1966) attributes to Kant some such principle as “there can be no legitimate, or even meaningful employment of ideas or concepts which does not relate them to empirical or experiential conditions of their application” (p. 16). The question is not whether Kant would accept some such principle, but whether he could do so at the outset as a way of securing his transcendental results, or only subsequently, and therefore legitimately, as a consequence of them. Strawson agrees that the principle was required if philosophy was to be set ‘on the sure path of a science’, and that that was something Kant wanted to prove, and not simply assume, but since the only support he can find in Kant for the principle comes from the doctrines of transcendental idealism, he prefers to treat it as ‘autonomous’ and therefore as independent of that (and apparently any other) putative support.

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  1. University of California, Berkeley, USA

    Barry Stroud

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  1. Barry Stroud
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I presented a paper very similar to this one in an American Philosophical Association Symposium on transcendental arguments, Dec. 1975.

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Stroud, B. Transcendental arguments and ‘epistemological naturalism’. Philos Stud 31, 105–115 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01857180

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