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Steep Cliff Arguments

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Abstract

In recent philosophical debates a number of arguments have been used which have so much in common that it is useful to study them as having a similar structure. Many arguments – Searle's Chinese Room, for example – make use of thought experiments in which we are told a story or given a narrative context such that we feel we are in comfortable surroundings. A new notion is then introduced which clashes with our ordinary habits and associations. As a result, we do not bother to investigate seriously the new notion any further. I call such an arrangement, which is perhaps a variation of the fallacy of presumption, a Steep Cliff argument. One remedy for the misdirection of a Steep Cliff argument is to tell a counterstory from the point of view of the rejected notion.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Rochester Institute of Technology, 92 Lomb Memorial Drive, Rochester, NY, 14623-5604 E-mail

    David B. Suits

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  1. David B. Suits
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Suits, D.B. Steep Cliff Arguments. Argumentation 13, 127–138 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026490224078

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1026490224078

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