Abstract
Research suggests that the explicit reasoning we offer to ourselves and to others is often rationalization, that we act instead on instincts, inclinations, stereotypes, emotions, neurobiology, habits, reactions, evolutionary pressures, unexamined principles, or justifications other than the ones we think we’re acting on, then we tell a post hoc story to justify our actions. This is troubling for views of moral progress according to which moral progress proceeds from our engagement with our own and others’ reasons. I consider an account of rationalization, based on Robert Audi’s, to make clear that rationalization, unlike simple lying, can be sincere. Because it can be sincere, and because we also have a desire to be consistent with ourselves, I argue that rationalization sets us up for becoming better people over time, and that a similar case can be made to explain how moral progress among groups of people can proceed via rationalization.
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Notes
The material in this section draws heavily on my account of rationalization, which I develop elsewhere (Summers, J.S. (forthcoming). Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc: Some Benefits of Rationalization. Philosophical Exploration). For alternative philosophical accounts of rationalization, see (D’Cruz 2015; Greenspan 2015; Schwitzgebel, E, Ellis, J (manuscript) Rationalization in Moral and Philosophical Thought)
I am assuming, for simplicity, that motives are relevant to the evaluation of an action. Even if one doubts this as a general principle, there are many cases in which the justification on which one acted determines what action is performed, e.g., whether my applause is appreciative or mocking may not differ physically, though they are morally quite distinct.
Failing to think about justifications, even rationalized ones, may bring further negative effects (Summers, J.S. (forthcoming). Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc: Some Benefits of Rationalization. Philosophical Explorations).
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Summers, J.S. Rationalizing our Way into Moral Progress. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 20, 93–104 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9750-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9750-5