Abstract
Rational outcomes of a social system do not necessarily require its individual participants to be rational. In macro systems, aggregate properties distinct from the behavior of their micro level components can emerge through complex interactions. Caution in building social sciences on assumption of methodological individualism seems appropriate.
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Prepared from remarks delivered at Humboldt-Kreis on Physics and Decisions, Berlin, Dec. 4–6, 2019. I thank the participants, and editors Shabnam Mousavi and Christian Schade for their helpful comments. I am grateful to Elizabeth Viloudaki for copy editing.
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Sunder, S. Rational order from ‘irrational’ actions. Mind Soc 19, 317–321 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-020-00245-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-020-00245-1