Skip to main content
Log in

Was Brzozowski a “constructionist”? A contemporary reading of Brzozowski’s “philosophy of labour”

  • Published:
Studies in East European Thought Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Brzozowski’s ‘philosophy of labour’—to which he devoted a number of writings starting in 1902—presents problems of interpretation. A conceptual approach to his conception shows it to be a sometimes uneasy mix of realist and anti-realist notions. Brzozowski appears to have thought that labour is not first of all about the things it supposedly transforms, but rather about itself. I suggest that Brzozowski can be read in the spirit of Nelson Goodman’s nominalist constructionalism (“worldmaking”). On this account, labour in Brzozowski’s idiom turns out to be the constitution of forms of symbolizing sufficient unto themselves and the needs they satisfy. However, that Brzozowski was not entirely consistent in the views I impute to him—he forever sought for some ‘external’ measure of the rightness of labour/symbolizing—can be explained at least in part by his ‘humanism’, that is, his commitment to the task he assigns humankind, that of creating the one meaningful world attesting to virtually unrestricted human power.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. There are a number of studies in Polish devoted to Brzozowski’s work as a whole and a few to his ‘philosophy of labour’. Of the latter I have profited from Sowa (1976) in particular.

  2. I will return in due course to question of whether physical labour is the paradigm instance of labour for Brzozowski.

  3. „Pracą nazywamy wysiłek zmieniający coś w sposób celowy w zewnętrznym świecie. […] Jest świat przedmiotów, pośród których żyjemy, obserwujemy te przedmioty, poznajemy ich własności i poznawszy za pomocą umiejętnie dobranych ruchów zaprowadzamy w nich dowolne zmiany. Tak dla rzekomo naiwnego postrzegania mają się rzeczy“ (Brzozowski 1990a, p. 213).

  4. „W istocie—załamuje się ten grunt“.

  5. „Poznajemy właściwości przedmiotów: czy w nich są one? Właściwości przedmiotów są w gruncie rzeczy pewną formą naszych przeżyć […], czymś, co nie prowadzi poza nas“. Ibid.

  6. „Jest to cecha określonego i przyjętego przez naszą wolę, uwarunkowanego przez nas, chcianego użytkowania pewnego momentu naszego życia. Jako gest wewnętrzny jest praca określonym przez nas przemijaniem życia.“ Ibid.

  7. The recursive aspect reduces the sense of implausibility with regard to the intransitivity issue if we understand it to mean relativity: today’s labour acts on the results of yesterday’s, such that a form of transitivity is restored that could be labelled ‘internal’ and holistic. The common sense realist conception is, on the contrary, externalist, in fact ‘dualist’, in that labour and its objects (the bare material) are understood to be entirely heterogeneous ontically and epistemologically. And the problem is then the one stated as a question in quotation (2) above. Whether or not Brzozowski’s held an internalist, holist conception will be a relevant question as we proceed.

  8. „[…] in what trivial sense are there […] many worlds? Just this, I think: that many different world versions are of independent interest and importance, without any requirement or presumption of reducibility to a single base. […] So long as contrasting right versions not all reducible to one are countenanced, unity is to be sought not in an ambivalent or neutral something beneath these versions but in an overall organization embracing them. […] My approach is […] through an analytic study of types and functions of symbols and symbol systems. […] universes of worlds as well as worlds themselves may be built in many ways“ (Goodman 1996, 63-65).

    I profited from two important studies on Goodman, (Küng 1993), and Shottenkirk (2009).

  9. Cf Hacking (2006, 23). He names Nietzsche as perhaps the first ‘dynamic nominalist’. An aphorism in The Gay Science begins: “There is something that causes me the greatest difficulty, and continues to do so without relief: unspeakably more depends on what things are called than on what they are.” It ends: “Creating new names and assessments and apparent truths is enough to create the new things.” Hacking adds that this not a static operation but a dynamic one, names ‘change’ but then so do the things named. The primary port of call of dynamic nominalism is ‘making up people’—our classifications and the contexts in which they are operative institute ways of being and behaving on the part of people who internalize the classifications through the ‘looping effect’. Goodman, we can say, generalizes—his nominalism, be it finally static or dynamic goes across the board.

  10. „Człowiek nie poznaje gotowego, istniejącego świata, lecz stwarza swój świat i z każdego osiągniętego stanowiska myślą usiłuje snuć dalsze drogi, dalsze formy, dalsze plany działania. Co się ostoi z jego działalności—jest, a więc myśl, jaką się kierował, działając, jest prawdziwa i rzeczywista, bo ją stworzył. Człowiek zna tylko siebie i rzeczywistość ostającą się wobec tego, co jest poza nami—pracę. By jednak to zrozumieć, człowiek musiał uznać za istotny typ swojego życia—pracę. Stwarzający cały ludzki świat—typ istnienia—człowiek pracujący dźwignąć się musiał z otchłani niepamięci i potępienia, stać się typem myśli i samowiedzy, aby poznanie przestało być dla myśli zagadką“. (Brzozowski 1990b, 203).

  11. Recall here Hegel’s aesthetics for whom art is superior to nature: it does not ‘imitate’, it infuses nature with spiritual content. This is a primary instance of ‘symbolization’ and ‘world-making’.

  12. Cited after Walicki 1989, p. 125

  13. „The many stuffs—matter, energy, waves, phenomena—that worlds are made of are made along with the worlds. But made from what? Not from nothing, after all, but from other worlds. Worldmaking as we know it always starts from worlds already on hand; the making is a remaking.“ Goodman 1959, 65.

  14. „Czymże jest rzeczywistość? Energią względnie materią czy myślą? Duchem czy ciałem? Zwróćmy uwagę na to, że wszystko, co stanowi przedmiot naszego doświadczenia i co uchodzi za cielesne, materialne, może uchodzić też za duchowe. […] Ten sam stół jest zjawiskiem fizycznym lub psychicznym zależnie od punktu widzenia: gdy rozważamy go niezależnie od nas, jest to przedmiot fizyczny, gdy zaś rozpatrujemy jego zależność od nas, jako widzianego, wyczuwanego lub pomyślanego stołu, mamy do czynienia ze zjawiskiem psychicznym. […] rzeczywistość sama przez się nie jest ani duchowa, ani cielesna, jest czymś „trzecim” […] i jedynie nasze różne stanowiska wobec tego trzeciego, nasze różne stosunki do niego—stwarzają w nim określenia…“ Brzozowski 1990c.

  15. It is worth recalling that Goodman studied under Carnap, his first major work, The Structure of Appearance (1951) being the development of ideas Carnap set down in his Logische Aufbau der Welt (1928), influenced in turn by the empiriocriticism of Mach and Avernarius. Interestingly, Brzozowski was versed to some extent in empiriocriticist philosophy, as the first, virtually impossible pages of his ‘Prolegomena’ from 1909 attest!

    For some information about Brzozowski and empiriocriticism see the essay in this issue by Daniela Steila.

  16. „Człowiek nie poznaje żadnego gotowego, zastanego świata, lecz zrazu bezwiednie, a dziś świadomie stwarza i uświadamia sobie różne formy działania. […] to, co jest poza nami, jest takie, że takie określone działania dadzą się wykonać i prowadzą do takich a takich określonych skutków“ Brzozowski 1990b, 195.

  17. “Miasta nasze, wojny, fabryki, dzieła sztuki, nauka—to nie jest sen, poza którym jest coś głębszego, co może wyzwolić. Jest to absolutna, nie dająca się zredukować rzeczywistość.” Brzozowski (1990a, 243). Jens Herlth drew my attention to this passage.

  18. The value problematic in the context described here surfaced explicitly in Brzozowski’s day in the Kulturphilosophie of, first of all, the neo-Kantians (especially Rickert, Weber, and Simmel). Shortly before his death Brzozowski wrote a short essay on the occasion of the one hundreth anniversary of Kant’s death. He presents the Kantian system of categories as an axiological system, since values turn out to be the basis of the categorization of reality (experience). Simmel’s Der Begriff und die Tragödie der Kultur, published in 1911, the year of Brzozowski’s demise, in effect took virtually all the themes that had been tormenting Brzozowski till then and squarely placed value at the core of the cultural enterprise. In the vein, Florian Znaniecki, followed much the same line in his early cultural theories.

References

  • Brzozowski, S. (1990a). Prolegomena filozofii „pracy”, in Idee. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brzozowski, S. (1990b). Przyroda i poznanie, in Idee. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brzozowski, S. (1990c). Filosofija czynu, in Idee. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elder, C. (2007). On the place of artefacts in ontology. In E. Margolis & S. Laurence (Eds.), Creations of the mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodman, N. (1959). Ways of worldmaking. Indianapolis: Hackett.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goodman, N. (1996). Words, works, worlds. In Peter. J. McCormick (Ed.), Starmaking. Realism, anti-realism, and irrealism. Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, I. (2006). Making up people. London Review of Books, 28(16), 23–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kołakowski, L. (1968), Karl Marx and the classical definition of truth. In Towards a Marxist Humanism, (Jane Z. Peel, Trans.). New York: Grove Press.

  • Kołakowski, L. (1978), Main currents of marxism. Its rise, growth, and dissolution. In Volume II: The golden age (P.S. Falla, Trans.). Oxford: Clarendon Press (Chapter XI. Stanisław Brzozowski: Marxism as historical subjectivism).

  • Küng, G. (1993), Ontology and the construction of systems. Synthese, nr 95.

  • Marx, K. (1867/1957), Das Kapital. Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, I. Die Produktionsprozess des Kapitals, Berlin: Dietz Verlag.

  • Shottenkirk, D. (2009). Nominalism and its aftermath. The philosophy of Nelson Goodman. New York/Heidelberg/Dordrecht: Springer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sowa, E. (1976). Pojęcie pracy w filozofii Stanisława Brzozowskiego. Kraków: Wydawnictwo literackie.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, P. (1959/1990), Individuals. An essay in descriptive metaphysics. London/New York: Routledge.

  • Walicki, A. (1989). Stanislaw Brzozowski and the Polish beginnings of “Western Marxism”. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to E. M. Swiderski.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Swiderski, E.M. Was Brzozowski a “constructionist”? A contemporary reading of Brzozowski’s “philosophy of labour”. Stud East Eur Thought 63, 329–343 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-011-9154-y

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-011-9154-y

Keywords

Navigation