Abstract
Conditionals and modals work in tandem in some instances of practical reasoning, or decision making. Consider the following example (from Kratzer 2012):
a. | I want to become a mayor. |
b. | (q) I will become a mayor only if (p) I go to the pub. |
c. | Therefore, I should go to the pub. |
Given what the cogniser wants (a) and the relevant circumstances (b), the conclusion that the cogniser goes to the pub comes out as necessary. Hence, the presence of the necessity modal should in (c). Indeed, given the context of (a), the necessity modal in (c) is simply a reflection of the necessity of p for q, which is overtly represented by the use of the ‘only if p, q’ construction. This chapter looks into whether indirect reports of conditionals – in particular, indirect reports which involve the use of a modal verb – are sensitive to the necessity of p for q in cases where necessity is not overtly represented in a conditional, as in ‘if p, q’ formulations.
We report on two online experiments into the relation between (i) perceived necessity or sufficiency of the truth of a conditional antecedent for the truth of the consequent, and (ii) the formulation of an indirect report of a conditional with necessity or possibility modals (have to, should, could). In Experiment 1, the ‘necessity/sufficiency of p for q’ variable was manipulated by contextually altering the number of alternative antecedents (e.g. Cummins et al. 1991; Thompson 1994; Politzer 2003). It was found that modals used in indirect reports of ‘if p, q’ conditionals co-vary with the number of alternative antecedents in predictable ways. This suggests that modals used in indirect reports of ‘if p, q’ conditionals may be a diagnostic for biconditional versus material interpretations of conditionals. The aim of Experiment 2 was to find out whether the results of Experiment 1 could be replicated in contexts which lower/eliminate the believability of the conditionals. It was found that manipulating the believability variable has no reliable effect on the results.
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Notes
- 1.
If necessity is at stake here, a formulation with must or have to would be equally acceptable.
- 2.
- 3.
The choice between could or should here is independent of the modal expression (likely) which is restricted by the if-clause in that, regardless of whether the researcher feels he should or could run the search, he still believes it is likely that the hypothesis will be falsified if he does run the search. However, the choice of could p or should p as opposed to e.g. will not p is dependent on the presence of likely in the consequent.
- 4.
See Geis & Lycan (1993) on conditional formulations and politeness strategies.
- 5.
Notice that the use of ‘weak’ in ‘weak obligation’ is not the same as use of ‘weak’ in ‘weak necessity’ as in e.g. von Fintel & Iatridou (2008). Von Fintel & Iatridou (2008) define strong necessity modals (e.g. must) as those which require the prejacent (i.e. the proposition X in must X) to be true in all of the favoured worlds (worlds in the modal base which are most highly ranked by the ordering source), while weak necessity modals (e.g. ought to) require the prejacent (X in ought to X) to be true in all of the very best (by some additional measure) among the favoured worlds. Given the facework strategy which dictates the use of should over have to, it transpires that should can be used to communicate weak obligation to do X in the presence of strong necessity to do X – example (6) is a case in point. This is not inconsistent with von Fintel & Iatridou (2008), who remain ‘officially agnostic’ about should (p.117).
- 6.
Cummins (1995) studies causal, rather than logical, necessity and sufficiency and finds the effect of reversal of the causal relation on the believability of the major premise (even though she talks of the effect on the rates of acceptance of the logical arguments such as Modus Ponens or Modus Tollens).
- 7.
In the examples (9)–(12), the direction of causal sufficiency and necessity corresponds to the sufficiency/necessity of p for q. If, however, the antecedents and consequents of (9)–(12) were reversed, causal sufficiency/necessity (but not inferential sufficiency/necessity) would correspond to the sufficiency/necessity of q for p (see Cummins 1995). We use p and q to refer to the antecedents and consequents of the conditionals under discussion, irrespective of the direction of causal sufficiency/necessity (though they happen to correspond).
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Sztencel, M., Duffy, S.E. (2019). Reporting Conditionals with Modals. In: Capone, A., García-Carpintero, M., Falzone, A. (eds) Indirect Reports and Pragmatics in the World Languages. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology, vol 19. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-78771-8_10
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