A considerable group of contemporary philosophers and theologians—including those engaged in the science-theology dialogue, such as Barbour, Clayton, Davies, and Peacocke—supports panentheism, i.e., a theistic position which assumes that the world is in God, who is yet greater than everything he created. They see it as a balanced middle ground between the positions of classical theism and pantheism. In this article, I offer a presentation and a critical evaluation of the most fundamental principles of panentheism from the point of view of classical theism. First, I list six main species of panentheism and the motivations of those who support it. In the second part, I analyze the three main difficulties concerning its ontological and theological principles, i.e., (1) the meaning of the preposition ‘in’ (en) in ‘panentheism’; (2) the accuracy of panentheistic definition of divine immanence, and (3) the question of whether panentheism is successful in protecting God’s transcendence. I conclude that panentheism fails as a Christian theistic position. Nevertheless, it might still be valuable and play an important role in addressing the cognitive drama of the modern human beings, often seduced by secular (scientific) or spiritual naturalism, or pantheism.
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Notes
It is commonly acknowledged that the term ‘panentheism’ (pan-en-Theos = all ‘in’ God, ‘Panentheismus, oder Allinngottlehre’) was coined by a German philosopher and mystic Karl Christian Friedrich Krause in his Vorlesungen Über Das System der Philosophie (1828). However, according to Clayton, it was Schelling who for the first time, in 1809, i.e., almost two decades earlier then Krause, in his famous Essay on Freedom, used the term ‘panentheism,’ although not as one word but a composition of its three constitutive parts: ‘Pan + en + theismus’ (see Clayton, 2010, 183). On Krause’s panentheism, see Benedikt Göcke (2018).
Göcke’s assertion triggered an exchange of arguments between him and Raphael Lataster published in Sophia. Challenging Göcke’s assertion Lataster claims (1) that at least for some panentheists, ‘the universe is of the substance of God;’ (2) that in the panentheistic scenario, ‘the universe qua universe is as unnecessary as the universe in the theistic scenario;’ (3) that panentheistic God, unlike God in classical theism, is both immutable and mutable; and (4) that panentheists for whom ‘the world is of the very substance of God’ may not ‘be committed to a creation and especially the typically monotheistic or classical theistic concept of creatio ex nihilo’ (Lataster, 2014). The remaining arguments in Göcke-Lataster exchange can be found in Göcke (2014), Lataster (2015) and Göcke (2015). For the further evaluation of Göcke’s position, see Richard Mullins, 2016, 338–42. It is also important to note that Göcke seems to have changed his opinion and now embraces panentheism, saying ‘that the most promising concept of God is panentheistic, on which the universe is essentially divine but is not exhaustive of the divine being’ (Göcke, 2017, 1).
In a more recent formulation of the process version of panentheism, Mark Johnston (2011, 119–120) asserts that ‘God is partly constituted by natural realm, in the sense that his activity is manifest in and through natural processes alone. … Here God is no longer in the category of substance, as in traditional theology, but in the category of activity.’ David Nikkel claims to offer a balanced version of panentheism, which builds upon, while overcoming the difficulties, of both the expressivist and process models: ‘Thus, I have attempted to overcome a deterministic pantheism or any [including the Hegelian] panentheism that compromises creaturely indeterminate freedom or some creaturely ability to affect the divine life, as well as to overcome deficiencies in process theology’s concept of divine causality [compromising divine sovereignty and perfection, making God too passible to the world’s evils], in drawing a panentheism that hopefully does justice to both the active (or self-expressive) and passive (or receptive) aspects of the divine and, thus, represents a full-fledged panentheism’ (Nikkel, 2015, 300, 292).
Nikkel (2015, 292) claims that ‘the raison d’être of panentheism was to re-balance transcendence and immanence in light of modern scientific knowledge. Rejecting what its originators considered the neglect of divine immanence in classical theism and deism, it attempted to affirm a strong divine interest and presence in the world but without supernatural intervention that controverted natural laws.’
Thomas Jay Oord, a prominent representative of open theism, in his recent article lists a number of theologians from among those mentioned here and says that those ‘prominent supporters of panentheism in the past and present fit comfortably under the open and relational label’ (Oord & Schwartz, 2020, 233).
Analyzing arguments in favor of open theism, James Rissler (2020, Sect. 1) says that ‘Many of the early Church Fathers affirmed elements of the Open Theists’ relational view of God, in tension with their beliefs in divine impassibility. Then Saint Augustine, whose Confessions tell us that his faith partially resulted from a careful study of neo-Platonism, forcefully argued for an emphasis on God’s perfection and otherness from His creation that precluded genuine responsiveness on God’s part to our actions. The (Western) Christian tradition subsequently became largely identified with an Augustinian understanding of providence.’
Donald Viney (2020, Introduction) lists open theism among other versions of theism which ‘were influenced by process theism, but they deny its claim that God is essentially in a give-and-take relationship with the world.’ On another occasion, he claims that ‘To speak of open theism as a school of thought distinct from process theism is ironic since God’s openness to creaturely influence is precisely the shared content of their views. Hartshorne referred to “the openness of God” in 1963, more than 30 years before the openness controversy erupted’ (ibid., Sect. 8).
Clayton (2019, 8) reminds us that according to Lakatos, ‘No RP [research program] can actually be falsified; the research community can generally only determine whether a research program is “progressive” or “degenerating.” The RP approach therefore does not allow for decisive, thumbs-up or thumbs-down judgments; it involves evaluating degrees of agreement among communities of scholars.’
Cooper (cf. 2006, 27) introduces five distinctions that are potentially helpful in categorizing particular versions of the doctrine within a taxonomy of different explications of the same view. These are (1) explicit and implicit panentheism; (2) personal and nonpersonal panentheism; (3) part-whole and relational panentheism; (4) voluntary and/or natural panentheism; and (5) classical (divine determinist) or modern (cooperative) panentheism.
Evaluating some recent definitions of panentheism, Lataster and Bilimoria refer to its Eastern formulations and suggest to ‘consider panentheism to be a type of pantheistic model of the divine.’ Bringing this assertion to its logical conclusion, they add that ‘To the panentheist, the “stuff” of the universe is quite literally the “stuff” of the deity.’ Consequently, ‘Only the divine can tell us what to do, but we are the divine! And unlike the poor [classical] theists, who are told that they are imperfect and must take action to get closer to the deity, we need do nothing, and we need feel no guilt. For we know that we are god. And we are what we are meant to be, at any moment in time. We do not wage destructive wars based on who worships the correct god. For we are all god.’ Speaking of the origin of the universe, Lataster and Bilimoria—in their criticism of Göcke—hold that he ignores ‘numerous—and more mainstream, as well as etymologically appropriate—panentheistic models where creatio is ex deo rather than ex nihilo, and similarly overlooks panentheistic models entailing no creation at all.’ (Lataster & Bilimoria, 2018, 51, 53, 52, 55).
Mullins (2016, 325) states that ‘One of the most notorious difficulties for panentheism is its vagueness. It is incredibly difficult to pin down exactly what panentheism is and how it differs from rival models of God.’ Likewise, Owen C. Thomas (2006, 654) finds unfortunate the fact that ‘Panentheism is not one particular view of the relationship of the divine to the world (universe), but rather, a large and diverse family of views involving quite different interpretations of the key metaphorical assertion that the world is in God. This is indicated by the common locution among panentheists that the world is “in some sense” in God, and by the fact that few panentheists go on to specify clearly and in detail exactly what sense is intended.’ In the same vein, Peterson (2001, 396) writes, ‘panentheists must begin to look more closely at the en that holds the position together and distinguishes it from its rivals.’
Thomas rightly notes that in process theism, God’s knowledge is neither complete nor of the contemporary world. He prehends actual occasions only after they reach their satisfaction and have perished. Furthermore, because God is not the Creator ex nihilo, the totality of the world, along with ‘eternal objects’ and ‘creativity,’ is ultimately unexplained.
Mullins (2016, 342) notices that even among modern advocates of absolute space and time we find Clarke who seems to be saying they are not divine attributes but necessary concomitants of God’s existence.
Gasser (2019) makes a similar objection and offers a critical evaluation of the panentheistic idea of God’s omnipresence in the universe.
Gasser agrees that the best way of speaking about God’s omnipresence is to refer to his nonfundamental occupational relation to contingent creatures by presence, by power, and by essence (see Gasser, 2019, 59–60). Moreover, based on this assertion, he goes further and claims that ‘All of creation is within the sphere of God’s creative, sustaining and caring agency or it is not at all. From my perspective, such an agentive reading captures in the most convincing way the core meaning of the particle “en” in panentheism. As a consequence, classical theism and panentheism are not two rival accounts of God; rather, they underline different aspects of one and the same God who is maximally transcendent and immanent at the same time’ (ibid., 60). As optimistic and promising as it may appear, I do not think that Gasser’s ‘ecumenical’ conviction captures all nuances and difficulties in trying to specify the meaning of the particle ‘en’ in panentheism that I described above.
Note that in the example of the father begetting his son, even if both are of the same nature, the relation between them is asymmetrical (they cannot exchange their roles of being a father and a son), yet real on both ends.
Brian Shanley (2002, 59) further explains: ‘Aquinas clearly thinks that God is “related” to the world in the sense that he creates, loves, knows, wills, governs, and redeems the world. The denial that God is “really related” to the world does not undermine any of these claims. It simply denies that God’s causal activity, and any relational terms thereby ascribed to him, implies any alteration in his being. When God acts so as to bring creatures into relationship with him, all of the “happening” is located in creation rather than in God.’
See Aquinas on (1) God as the Creator of primary matter: ST I, 44, 2, co. (1946 [1962]); (2) God as the source of all substantial forms: In Phys. I, lect. 15 (§ 135) (1999 [1965]); (3) God as the ground of all efficient causes: ST I, 105, 5, co. (1946 [1962]); (4) God as the ultimate final cause: ST I, 6, 4, co.; ST I, 44, 4, ad 3 (1946 [1962]).; (5) God working through events attributed to chance and fortune: ST I, 103, 7, ad 2. (1946 [1962]); (6) God’s primary and principal agency through secondary and instrumental causes: De ver. 27, 4, co.; ad 8 (1993 [1972-1976]); In Sent. III, 18, 1, 1, ad 4 (1929); SCG III, 147, no. 6 (1955-1957 [1961]), ST I, 45, 5, co.; III, 19, 1, co.; 62, 1, co.; ad 2; 62, 4, co.; 66, 5, ad 1 (1946 [1962]).
In his book offering a new argument in favor of the perfect-being theism, Yujin Nagasawa (2017) suggests a departure from what he calls ‘The Omni God Thesis,’ i.e., from defining God in reference to attributes such as knowledge or power realized (actualized) to the highest degree (omniscience and omnipotence, respectively). He claims perfect being theism needs a more minimal claim called ‘The Maximal God Thesis,’ which says that God has the maximal consistent set of knowledge, power, and benevolence. But one might challenge Nagasawa’s position asking, once again, whether the metaphysically greatest being—a being that is extensively and intensively superior to all other beings with regards to great-making properties (i.e., properties that contribute to the intrinsic greatness of their possessors)—deserves to be called God, and not merely the greatest contingent being among other contingent beings.
One of the reviewers emphasized the extent to which this notion of God’s transcendence is grounded in Aquinas’s cosmological/metaphysical argument for the existence of God, which provides the needed support for the immutability and eternity of God, which many a panentheist simply does not mention. If there is change, and change is the actualization of a potential, then, in a hierarchical series of causes, we have to assume that there is an unactualized actualizer (actus purus). As such, it must be one and free from potentiality, hence, eternal and unchanging (see ST I, 2, 3, 1946 [1962]).
Peacocke distances himself from process ontology when he claims that panentheism as such is ‘not at all dependent on that particular metaphysical system’ (Peacocke, 1993, 371–372, footnote no. 75).
Wojtysiak is right when he says that panentheists accused of blurring the boundary between God and the world through offering an image of God who is its part or corelate would most likely challenge classical theism with the opposite charge of separating God from his creation, saying that ‘a sharp distinction between God and the world has led in the modern period to deism and to the apparent impossibility of divine action’ (Clayton 2004a, 82). We must not forget, however, that the distinction between God and creation in classical theism—unlike in deism—does not happen at the cost of overemphasizing the autonomy of the world. Quite the contrary, the world differs ontologically from God precisely because without him it can neither come into existence nor keep in existence for even a moment. Hence, the world shows ‘traces’ of God’s presence and action at each moment of its existence and each level of its complexity. It is perceived as the action of God as primary and principal cause, working through secondary and instrumental causation of his creatures.
Abbreviations
- In Phys.:
-
In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio
- In Sent.:
-
Scriptum super libros Sententiarum
- De ver.:
-
Quaestiones disputatae de veritate
- SCG:
-
Summa contra gentiles
- ST:
-
Summa theologiae
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Tabaczek, M. The Image of God in Western (Christian) Panentheism: A Critical Evaluation from the Point of View of Classical Theism. SOPHIA 61, 611–642 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-021-00848-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-021-00848-2