Abstract
I propose a counterfactual theory of infinite regress arguments. Most theories of infinite regress arguments present infinite regresses in terms of indicative conditionals. These theories direct us to seek conditions under which an infinite regress generates an infinite inadmissible set. Since in ordinary language infinite regresses are usually expressed by means of infinite sequences of counterfactuals, it is natural to expect that an analysis of infinite regress arguments should be based on a theory of counterfactuals. The Stalnaker–Lewis theory of counterfactuals, augmented with some fundamental notions from metric-spaces, provides a basis for such an analysis of infinite regress arguments. Since the technique involved in the analysis is easily adaptable to various analyses, it facilitates a rigorous comparison among conflicting philosophical analyses of any given infinite regress.
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Acknowledgement
I would like to thank Teo Grünberg, David Grünberg, Erdinç Sayan and an anonymous referee of Acta Analytica for constructive feedback that helped me improve the content of this article.
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Taşdelen, İ. A Counterfactual Analysis of Infinite Regress Arguments. Acta Anal 29, 195–213 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0199-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0199-z