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Notes
Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) ch. 5.
See Thomas Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998) ch. 6, esp. pp. 290–294.
See R. A. Duff, “Principle and Contradiction in the Criminal Law: Motives and Criminal Liability,” in Philosophy and the Criminal Law: Principle and Critique (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and Duff “‘I Might Be Guilty, But You Can’t Try Me’: Estoppel and Other Bars to Trial,” 1 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law (2003); see also G. A. Cohen, “Casting the First Stone: Who Can, and Who Can’t, Condemn the Terrorists?”, 81 Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements (2006).
Cf. R. A. Duff, Answering for Crime (Oxford: Hart, 2007), pp. 23–30; see also Tadros, op. cit., ch. 1.
See S. E. Marshall and R. A. Duff, “Criminalization and Sharing Wrongs,” 11 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (1998); see also R. A. Duff, Punishment, Communication and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. E. Marshall and V. Tadros, The Trial on Trial Case 3: Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal Trial (Oxford: Hart, 2007); and R. A. Duff, Answering for Crime.
See Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 25–26.
See Tadros, op. cit., ch. 9.
See ibid., ch. 10; see also Thomson op. cit, pp. 172–173.
See Victor Tadros, “The Scope and the Grounds of Responsibility,” New Criminal Law Review (2008); see also Thomson op. cit., pp. 172–173.
Thanks are due to Andrew Williams on this matter.
See John Gardner, “Justifications and Reasons,” in Offences and Defences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); see also Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, ch. 10.
Cf. Judith Jarvis Thomson Rights, Restitution and Risk (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); see also Thomas Scanlon, “Intention and Permissibility I,” 74 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes (2000); F. M. Kamm, Intricate Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 132–133; and Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, ch. 10.
See Duff, Answering for Crime, pp. 192–193.
Duff, “‘I Might Be Guilty, But You Can’t Try Me’: Estoppel and Other Bars to Trial,” pp. 245, 257–259.
See Jean Hampton, “Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution,” in The Intrinsic Worth of Persons: Contractarianism in Moral and Political Philosophy (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
See Thomas Scanlon, “Punishment and the Rule of Law,” in The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
See Section 51 of the Firearms Act 1968.
See Victor Tadros, “Crimes and Security” 71 Modern Law Review (2008).
An earlier version of this article was delivered to the political philosophy discussion group at Queen’s University in Kingston Ontario. I would like to thank the participants, the organizers Malcolm Thorburn, and Andrew Lister, and also Kimberley Brownlee and Andrew Williams for their generous comments and discussion.
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Tadros, V. Poverty and Criminal Responsibility. J Value Inquiry 43, 391–413 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-009-9180-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-009-9180-x