Abstract
In this paper I offer a counterexample to the so called vagueness argument against restricted composition. This will be done in the lines of a recent suggestion by Trenton Merricks, namely by challenging the claim that there cannot be a sharp cut-off point in a composition sequence. It will be suggested that causal powers which emerge when composition occurs can serve as an indicator of such sharp cut-off points. The main example will be the case of a heap. It seems that heaps might provide a very plausible counterexample to the vagueness argument if we accept the idea that four grains of sand is the least number required to compose a heap—the case has been supported by W. D. Hart. My purpose here is not to put forward a new theory of composition, I only wish to refute the vagueness argument and point out that we should be wary of arguments of its form.
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Notes
As Merricks puts it, a ‘composition continuum’ is simply what Sider calls a ‘continuous series of cases’, a sequence (Merricks 2005: 623). I will use Merricks’s terminology here, with apologies to any mathematicians who might be offended by the use of the notion of ‘continuum’ like this (thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing out this concern).
In fact he introduced the example already in Merricks (2001: 127–28).
In fact, Lowe (2005) uses the rock example exactly for this purpose.
One could perhaps suggest that we can account for the change in the causal powers of the rock simply in terms of the weight of the removed granite particle(s) (thanks to an anonymous referee for this objection). However, if one wishes to maintain that we are dealing with the same rock all the time and that we can add and subtract as many granite particles as we like, as this objection seems to imply, then it appears that a single granite particle and a mountain could be said to be the same rock, and this is surely implausible. If we instead adopt the view that causal powers are essential features of entities, we have a different rock in each case. Thus, the problem is that we do not have any plausible criteria for distinguishing between a single granite particle and a mountain if we insist that we are dealing with the same rock after removing one granite particle from the original.
Perhaps I should note here that instead of grains of sand, we could use, say, lead atoms and construct the heap in a vacuum—this should help to remove any potential complications.
References
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Tahko, T.E. Against the Vagueness Argument. Philosophia 37, 335–340 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9172-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9172-2