Abstract
The study describes a method created for the analysis of persuasive strategies, called rhetorical heuristics, which can be applied in speeches where the argument focuses primarily on questions of fact. First, the author explains how the concept emerged from the study of classical oratory. Then the theoretical background of rhetorical heuristics is outlined through briefly discussing relevant aspects of the psychology of decision-making. Finally, an exposition of how one could find these persuasive strategies introduces rhetorical heuristics in more detail.
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Notes
To the extent that modern oratory applies the rules and techniques of classical rhetoric in arguments based on facts and conjecture. The comment should also be used as a caveat that in my research on rhetorical heuristics I worked primarily on ancient speeches and looked at only one modern example where heuristics can be identified. It should therefore be taken as a theoretical possibility which requires further study, especially on Greek and contemporary oratorical material.
It is important to note that the term “rhetorical heuristics” has already been used before in rhetorical scholarship and argumentation theory. However the meaning of the word “heuristic” used in these studies (as far as it can be made clear in every instance) is not simply different from mine, but in many sense fundamentally opposite to it. They regard classical rhetorical schemes of the inventio, the art of finding rhetorical material, like the topoi or staseis, places i.e. grounds of proof, themselves as heuristic strategies that can be applied in composition or media analysis (Heath 1994; Laurel 1967; Underwood 1980). I demonstrated (Tahin 2009) that in the practice of ancient oratory these schemes alone were not enough to provide complex persuasive strategies in individual forensic or political cases.
For the concept of imitation see Rhet. ad Alex. 1428a–29a. The author there uses the word paradeigmata, patterns or models, to describe the mental propositions and reasoning patterns in the mind of the audience the orators need to imitate to make his speech both plausible and probable. To imagine a model of the application of rhetorical heuristics, one may also think of how chess players learn to use different strategies from beginner’s to master level. At the beginning of the process, they follow the strategies they learnt rather mechanically. Later on, as their knowledge of different strategies increases and becomes more complex, they combine strategies and use them in a much more abstract and intuitive way (Mero 1990).
The relationship of classical rhetoric and rhetorical heuristics should not be considered antagonistic. Both approaches describe persuasive oratorical arguments from different perspectives. I regard rhetorical heuristics a more advanced stage of rhetorical analysis that intends to explain creative procedures of producing an effective argument in a complex rhetorical situation where evidence is scarce or uncertain or external conditions are highly contingent.
There is a vast scholarship on the rhetorical analysis of Ciceronian speeches, of which I cite only those that are directly relevant to my research. It is impossible to evaluate that scholarship even in outlines. I would only like to make the point that almost all of the studies on the persuasive aspects of Ciceronian speeches rely to a greater or lesser extent on the categories and general approach of classical rhetoric, from which I tried to distance myself gradually while uncovering strategies based on probability. However, that does not in any way mean that I am not indebted to the works of Ciceronian scholars, especially those of Stroh, Classen and Powell. (Heinze 1925; Solmsen 1938; Neumeister 1964; Stroh 1975, 2000; Classen 1985, 1985; May 1988; Craig 1979, 1993; Powell and Paterson 2004; Powell 2007).
My research concentrated mainly on the analysis of Ciceronian speeches. I nevertheless looked at a small number of Greek speeches (e.g. Demosthenes 19, Lysias 7 and 16) and a modern one (US Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation to the UN Security Council on the US case against Iraq on 6th February 2003) as well to test the application of the concept in material other than Ciceronian oratory.
A definition of inventio is given by the Rhet. Her. 1.2.3 Inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut veri similium, quae causam probabilem reddant. (“Invention is the thinking up of matters which are true or similar to the truth, which would render the case plausible.”) The most detailed studies on the rules of the invention are Rhet. Herenn. 1–2, Cicero De Inv. and Quintilian Inst Or. 4–6. (see also Lausberg 1990: 40–240).
The theory of the topoi first summarised by Aristotle in his Topics, then disseminated by such works as the Rhetorica ad Herennium or Cicero’s Topica. (The topics have a vast literature in modern argumentation theory. The best available treatment of the subject today is Rubinelli 2009). Topics as an intricate and flexible system of argumentation provided schemes for a range of individual arguments that could be applied in speeches. However, the system of topics did not offer rules on joining individual arguments in a strategy, which is why I do not consider them rhetorical heuristics. Cf. Quint. Inst. Or. 5.10.119–120.
One reason for this was that Quintilian wrote his book for the pupils of rhetoric, who were not expected to perform at the level of an experienced orator. (A fairly good analogy here would be a difference between an intermediate handbook on chess strategy and the knowledge and experience of a chess master, which cannot be taught by a simple handbook.) Another reason was that the partes orationis, parts of speech, provided the overall structure of the speech, of which the argumentatio was only one element.
Cf. Aristotle Rhet. 1.1.1 “for everyone tries up to a certain extent both to prove by testing and sustain an argument and to defend themselves and accuse (others)” and 1.2.1 “Let us define rhetoric as the ability to discover what is plausible in each (possible) case.” These may sound a commonplace, but even Aristototle does not fully bring out how intrinsically the adversarial nature of oratory is related to the inherent plausibility and probability of one’s argument.
Such an understanding is reflected from the unique definition of eikos in Rhet. Alex. 1428a. The author there advises the orator to make probable claims based on patterns, models or examples (paradeigmata) found in the minds (en tois dianoiais) of the listeners. (cf. Burnyeat 1994).
A number of studies describe the psychology of persuasion from an inter-personal viewpoint (Zentai 1998). In advocacy the most delicate task of the orator is to present a speech in a way that the audience would follow and accept its argument without assessing it critically and comparing it to an opposing argument.
Just as Demosthenes does in his speech called On The False Embassy. It should nevertheless be pointed out that it is not enough simply to use reasons that the majority of the people would accept as true. The task of the orator or arguer is to make general probabilities applicable in a particular case. This can only be done if one considers what the listeners would accept as probably true in the case which he is arguing about.
An example would be to judge whether Paul is an investment banker or a teacher by looking at his qualities. If Paul shares some stereotypical qualities of bankers, like good mathematical and analytical skills and the love of luxury, then people would most likely judge him to be a banker than a teacher, regardless of the base rate of bankers and teachers. When searching for an answer, people would also consider more the congruent characteristics of Paul (like his analytical skills) and ignore the incongruent ones (like his aversion to taking risks).
For example, watching a series on air accident investigations could make me come to a conclusion that air travel is far more dangerous than, say, driving my car every day, whereas statistically the opposite is true.
The classical example of anchoring and adjustment heuristic is the study where people were asked to judge the percentage of African countries as members of the United Nations. Those who were asked “Was it more or less than 45%?” stated lower values than those who were asked whether it was more or less than 65%. The experiment shows that in complex problems the mind tries to work out an answer by searching for data that we already know. Supplying such data greatly affects the estimate of probabilities.
Cf. Cic. De Or. 102 Equidem soleo dare operam, ut de sua quisque re me ipse doceat et ut ne quis alius adsit, quo liberius loquatur, et agere adversarii causam ut ille agat suam et, quidquid de sua re cogitarit, in medium proferat. Itaque quum ille discessit tres personas unus sustineo summa animi aequitate, meam, adversarii, iudicis. “As for my part, I used to take care that a client himself should explain his case to me and that no one should be present, so that he would speak more openly. I also argue the case of the opposite side so that he would bring forward any matter with regards to his own case. In that way, when he leaves, I assume three characters with complete equality, mine, that of the opponent and that of the judge.”
A good example is the connection between the ‘replacement’ heuristic in Cicero Clu. 1–9 and the ‘anchoring and adjustment’ heuristic in Clu. 11–8.
That shows a plausible relationship between the ‘replacement’ heuristic and the ‘anchoring and adjustment’ heuristic, a form of cross-fertilisation.
In the case of Cicero Clu. 9–160 and 161–94 ‘disproportioning’ is realised by the help of the ‘narrative consistency’ heuristic, that helped maintaining the apparent necessity of telling the story of Oppianicus senior’s crimes with the emphasis on the infamous iudicium Iunianum, the trial of Oppianicus senior before Iunius.
As is the case in Antiph. 5., where the charge against Euxitheus the Mytilenean, for killing the Athenian Herodes rests almost completely on arguments from likelihood. The confession of a slave, supposedly present at the crime scene, under torture and a suspicious message by Euxitheus could prove the involvement of the defendant. The speaker, however, did not have firm counter-evidence to prove his alibi (although he pretends to have it), he had to attack the certainty of the charge with probability arguments.
For a full analysis of the speeches see Tahin (2009).
The argument is introduced quite unexpectedly and casually, ostensibly to counter Torquatus strategy to diminish Cicero’s authority and thereby weaken the defence of the defendant. However, it can be read almost as an early propositio that sets out the main theme of the argument. 2 Et quoniam L. Torquatus… existimavit, si nostram in accusatione sua necessitudinem familiaritatemque violasset, aliquid se de auctoritate meae defensionis posse detrahere, cum huius periculi propulsatione coniungam defensionem offici mei. “And since Lucius Torquatus… thought that if he injured our friendship and close relationship in his accusation, then this way he could weaken my authority a little, I will connect the attempt of driving back the danger from this man with the defence of my conduct in official duty.”
Berry (Berry 1998) takes digressio in the sense of Quint. 4.3.9–17. …frequenter utilis (sc. est) ante quaestionem praeparatio… “a preparation (i.e. the digression) is often useful before the examination of the main issue” Quintilian seems to advocate here a rather flexible view on digressions, which can include every inessential, yet useful section of the speech (such as indignatio, expression of indignation, miseratio, appeal to pity, invidia, arousing ill will, convicium, abuse, excusatio, excuse, conciliatio, winning over the audience) that contributes to the fair appreciation of one’s arguments (…ad conciliandum probationibus nostris iudicem).
Although even such a statement would go beyond classical rhetorical precepts and imply some sort of a strategy that I called heuristic.
After all, if Cicero is right in appealing to his consular authority, the jury could suppose that he has also an intimate knowledge about the forthcoming evidence, as well.
A rather interesting fact is that Cicero states the exact charge, Occidisse patrem arguitur, "he is accused of having killed his father”, only at 37. It is not clear whether it is really a pedantic adherence to the rules of dispositio, as the major proposition in the argument, or there were other reasons to postpone the statement that far in the speech.
6 Quae res ea est? (i.e. that no senior advocate is willing to step forward to represent Roscius junior in the trial) Bona patris huiusce Sex. Rosci, quae sunt sexagiens,… duobus milibus nummum sese dicit emisse adulescens vel potentissimus hoc tempore nostrae civitatis, L. Cornelius Chrysogonus. “What is that matter?… Lucius Cornelius Chrysogonus, one of the most powerful young men of our city at this time, says he bought the properties of the father of this Sextus Roscius, which are worth six million sesterces, for two thousand sesterces…”.
Probably the most blatantly inadequate claim about the murder (which takes its support from Cicero’s allegation at 6–7) appears in 17, where a simple narrative of the murder full of gaps is supposed to be enough to conclude that spero ex hoc ipso non esse obscurum, ad quem suspicio malefici pertineat; “I hope it is very clear from this fact on whom the suspicion of crime falls.”
39 qui homo? adulescentulus corruptus …vetus videlicet sicarius, homo audax et saepe in caede versatus.; luxuries igitur hominem nimirum et aeris alieni magnitude et indomitae animi cupiditates ad hoc scelus impulerunt. “What sort of person? a depraved young man… ? Clearly he is an experienced assassin, a daring man, and someone often engaged in murders?…So certainly luxury and the magnitude of his debts and his uncontrolled desires drove him to this wickedness?”.
Cicero is very much fond of this type of heuristic, although he never uses it in such a plain form as Lysias. A good example in the Ciceronian corpus is the Pro Cluentio, where the major charge, the poisoning of the young Oppianicus, is presented by Cicero as an irrelevant accusation against his client compared with the prejudice created by the disgraceful iudicium Iunianum.
See note 23.
That assumption is nevertheless supported by Quintilian. He argues in the end of the fifth book of his rhetorical opus that orators had already created different types of arguments before rhetoricians collected them for educational purposes. That statement, if true, seems to indicate that orators used strategies before these were compiled by teachers of rhetoric. Quint. Inst. Or. 5.10.120 Neque enim artibus editis factum est ut argumenta inueniremus, sed dicta sunt omnia antequam praeciperentur, mox ea scriptores obseruata et collecta ediderunt. Cuius rei probatio est quod exemplis eorum ueteribus utuntur et ab oratoribus illa repetunt, ipsi nullum nouum et quod dictum non sit inueniunt. “For the arguments were discovered not as a result of the publication of handbooks, but every argument (i.e. that is described in the handbooks) had already been presented before any rules were taught, and then writers of rhetoric observed them and published them in a collection. A proof of this is the fact that they use old examples and they take those from the orators, while they themselves discover nothing new or anything that had not been said before.”
The most important and intricate examples of these strategies are the so-called eikos-arguments in early Greek oratory, especially in Antiphon’s Tetralogies and Gorgias’ Palamedes. Although these arguments are derived from probability and show a high level of complexity, I do not regard them as fully developed rhetorical heuristics as they were not intended for actual audience. (Gagarin 1984, 1997; Kraus 2007).
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Acknowledgments
I thank Prof. M. Edwards, Prof. J. G. F. Powell and Dr Berry for their critical remarks on the concept of rhetorical heuristics.
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Tahin, G. Rhetorical Heuristics: Probabilistic Strategies in Complex Oratorical Arguments. Argumentation 25, 1–21 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9200-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9200-4