Abstract
Lynne Rudder Baker’s constitution theory of persons explains the relationship between persons and their bodies. Baker’s theory can explain the ontological status of persons. However, her explanation of the distinction between persons and their bodies faces a problem. In this paper, first, I show that her account, in fact, does not amount to a real distinction between persons and their bodies. Then, by discussing the notion of ‘derivatively having property,’ I propose a notion of constitution which is compatible with the idea that persons and their bodies are, ontologically speaking, distinct entities. This notion of constitution helps us to avoid both the problem of too many minds and the problem of substance dualism.
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