Abstract
Contemporary Neo-Berlinians contend that value pluralism is the best account of the moral universe we inhabit; they also contend that value pluralism provides a powerful case for liberalism. In this paper, I challenge both claims. Specifically, I will examine the arguments offered in support of value pluralism; finding them lacking, I will then offer some reasons for thinking that value pluralism is not an especially promising view of our moral universe.
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Notes
It should be emphasized that I am interested here in decidedly Berlinian version of pluralism. To be sure, there are many philosophical views that are pluralist, some of which are only loosely related to Berlin’s version of the doctrine. I count Raz (1986), Nussbaum (1986), and Stocker (1990) among those promoting versions of pluralism that are Berlin-inspired but yet not Berlinian; Rescher (1993) promotes a view of pluralism that is decidedly not Berlinian, whereas Williams (1973) and Flathman (2005) propose pluralisms that are indebted to Berlin, but importantly different from Berlin’s. In any case, I do not engage the non-Berlinian versions here and will use the term to refer solely to the Berlinian views. It should also be mentioned that I will focus on Berlinian pluralisms that are, like Berlin’s, liberal. Accordingly, although the work of Gray and Kekes will be helpful in getting clear on the details of pluralism as a conception of value, I shall be concerned later in the paper exclusively with Galston and Crowder, both of whom contend that pluralism provides a powerful conception of liberal politics.
See the papers in Chang 1997 for full treatment of the issue.
Chang calls such cases “nominal-notable comparisons” (1997: 14). The possibility of such comparisons—e.g., between the notable literary achievement of Hamlet and the nominal virtuosity of the jingle-writer—undermines the intuition that the oddness of questions comparing two notable exemplars of different artistic genres is due to the heterogeneity of the values notable works in those genres bear.
Cf. Hardy 2007: 283 f.
Crowder’s remaining two arguments are that (1) value pluralism comports with our experience of value conflict, and (2) value pluralism alone can countenance the possibility of rational regret in cases of value conflict (2002: 73). In the discussion that follows, I take these two arguments to be internally connected: the pluralist claims that the experience of value conflict leads us to regret in cases where we are confident that we have done the right thing over all, and only the value pluralist can see this regret as rational.
Cf. Galston, “It is concrete experience that provides the most compelling reasons for accepting some form of value pluralism” (2002: 33).
For the pluralist, the “right thing overall” is determined by the contextualized and particularized process of “weighing” the values which I mentioned briefly above.
Hence Kekes: “If, say, we thought that all values derived from whatever they contributed to happiness, then we would simply choose the value that gave more happiness, and we would not regret having foregone lesser happiness, since what we want is greater happiness” (1993: 57). Cf. Stocker 1990: 272.
Galston writes, “If regret is a rational moral emotion, it is because the clash of plural values evokes it. Conversely, if monism is correct, regret is unreasonable” (2005: 18). Cf. Crowder, “If monism were true, then all genuine values would fit together so that to act rightly could never involve any absolute loss which it would make sense to regret . . . . But experience teaches that we are frequently confronted by regrettable loss even when we are acting rightly” (2004: 131). See also Crowder 2002: 72.
In response to Newey, Galston simply writes, “I confess that I do not see how [monists can countenance rational regret]” (2005: 18).
Michael Stocker provides a strong—but I think not decisive—response to Hurka in an online symposium devoted to Hurka’s essay. See also Hooker’s contribution in defense of Hurka, and Hurka’s own reply: http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/bears/symp-hurka.html (accessed January 5, 2010).
I owe this paragraph and the one that follows to a suggestion made to me by Douglas Lackey. See Plaw 2004 for a similar kind of argument.
One could plausibly argue that ties go to the moral skeptic, but I cannot pursue this issue here.
Of course, Berlin originally proposed pluralism as a way to defend liberal society against totalitarianism (2002: 216 f.). See also Galston, “no illiberal regime can justify its practices in a manner consistent with value pluralism” (2005: 191). Compare Crowder, “From the point of view of value pluralism, which by definition involves a genuine appreciation of the fact that a wide range of values contributes to the good life for human beings, a society or way of life that focuses on only one or a few of those values to the exclusion of others cannot be a satisfactory society or way of life” (2002: 140).
It is worth noting that Gray holds that pluralism entails a “modus vivendi,” Hobbesian liberalism (2000: 105 ff.). In this respect Gray is a Berlinian pluralist who disagrees sharply with both Galston and Crowder. I criticize Gray’s liberalism in my 2002.
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Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Scott Aikin, James Bednar, W. James Booth, Kimberley Brownlee, Marilyn Friedman, Gerald Gaus, John Goldberg, Lenn Goodman, Michael Harbour, Micah Hester, Gary Jaeger, Betsy Jelinek, Jonathan Neufeld, Alastair Norcross, David Reidy, Peter Simpson, Jeffrey Tlumak, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal for helpful discussion and comments. Research for this paper was supported by a Research Scholar grant from Vanderbilt University.
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Talisse, R.B. Value Pluralism and Liberal Politics. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 14, 87–100 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9229-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-010-9229-8