Abstract
In this chapter I show that idealising assumptions can obscure conversational dynamics because they neglect power differentials that are crucial enablers of the successful performance of some speech acts. I examine how silencing is promoted by conversational norms that would defeasibly entitle linguistic agents to presume that silence indicates acceptance. I focus on Goldberg’s (Conversational Pressure: Normativity in Speech Exchanges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020) discussion of these phenomena. Goldberg argues in support of a norm of no silent rejections, claiming that silencing is partly the result of the misapplication of this norm. He further defends the view that the norm itself is part of the solution to the problem of silencing. In the chapter I argue that Goldberg is mistaken on these points. Instead, drawing inspiration from Sbisà (Illocuzione e dislivelli di potere. In Linguaggio d’odio e autorità, ed. by Claudia Bianchi and Laura Caponetto, 63–86. Milano-Udine: Mimesis), I argue that norms of no silent rejection are temporarily enacted by means of speech acts that function as exercitive assertions.
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Notes
- 1.
This principle prescribes that one makes one’s contribution to a conversation such ‘as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which [one is] engaged’ (Grice 1975, 26).
- 2.
I set aside Goldberg’s (2020, 167) additional arguments that in serious conversations we conform to a norm NSR+ which entitles participants to presume that silence indicates belief.
- 3.
However, there is a difficulty here in characterising the conditions in which NON-CONVERSATION obtains. If it were true in any circumstance in which someone is not cooperative, then it would be impossible to violate NSR, since any behaviour that seemingly violates it would create circumstances that lie outside the range of application of the norm.
- 4.
Other such contexts, whilst being conversations, are cases where OUTWEIGHING EXPLANATION obtains.
- 5.
Plausibly OUTWEIGHING EXPLANATION also holds when these outweighing practical reasons excuse, rather than justify, silence. Goldberg (2020, 176, fn. 55) is somewhat vague about what kinds of reasons can function as defeaters.
- 6.
These responses are also used to indicate understanding. Further, it might be unclear which specific propositional content has been nodded through. I suspect this is because conversants evaluate the overall gist of a conversational contribution rather than parse it into individual sentences.
- 7.
I should add that there are many cultural variations in turn-taking, the use of continuants, and so forth. I gloss these over here because I do not think that such variation invalidates my main point.
- 8.
Without an explicit signal the potentially harmful assertion would be seamlessly incorporated into the common ground (Stalnaker 2002).
- 9.
We also disapprove of people who do not resist oppression when they have an obligation to do so. In some cases, these people have a moral obligation to speak. Hence, we censor them for their silence. I have discussed these cases when considering Goldberg’s third piece of evidence for NSR.
- 10.
This would be something akin to a discursive injustice that occurs when a linguistic agent performs a speech act other than the one she intends, and attempts, to perform despite legitimately expecting to be able successfully to perform it (Kukla 2014). Thanks to Laura Caponetto for pressing this point.
- 11.
See Sbisà (1999) on the manner in which ideological content is often presupposed rather than explicitly articulated in speech exchanges.
- 12.
Goldberg could respond that the double harm occurs only when a silenced individual is not aware that she has been silenced or that others have been. It is hard to think such a person exists. Since Goldberg’s arguments are driven by the desire to portray oppressed individuals as epistemically rational, it does not seem a gain to explain the double harm in terms of their alleged ignorance of blatantly obvious facts about oppression.
- 13.
This is not to deny that sometimes silence is ambiguous and hard to interpret.
- 14.
This claim presupposes that participants have formulated doxastic responses to the assertions they have witnessed. Goldberg (2020, 96–97) argues that participants in a conversation owe it to speakers to evaluate properly, in accordance with the relevant epistemic standards, speakers’ competence with regard to the asserted content. Participants who do not do this, barring excuses or justifications, are disrespectful to speakers. Hence, participants have an obligation to either reject or accept the asserted contents. That is, they have an obligation to formulate a doxastic response.
- 15.
Note that the benefit to each of knowing that 1000 participants agree as opposed to 999 is so small that it might be outweighed by the effort required to communicate. Communication is always effortful including when such communication is achieved by choosing to be silent. Goldberg acknowledges that something like this might be the case and classifies these circumstances as a defeating condition.
- 16.
This is the argument implicitly deployed by Goldberg (2020) on p. 204.
- 17.
This argument for efficiency relies on assumptions that could be questioned. The first is that silence is not a mark. I have hinted above to reasons why this might not be true. The second is that silence is not effortful. This is also unlikely to be true since it might require resisting impulses to respond. In order properly to assess Goldberg’s claim one would need to be clear about his interpretation of efficiency.
- 18.
I would like to thank the editors of this volume for their helpful suggestions. Jessica Brown, Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Greg Restall, and other members of Archè offered useful comments that greatly improved this chapter. Special thanks to Sandy Goldberg for making every speech exchange with him a conversation.
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Tanesini, A. (2023). Speech in Non-ideal Conditions: On Silence and Being Silenced. In: Caponetto, L., Labinaz, P. (eds) Sbisà on Speech as Action. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-22528-4_10
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