Abstract
Japan has absorbed many western ideas since the late nineteenth century, but Japanese philosophers have often been reluctant to accept the western idea of the “I” in its entirety. The I transgresses to the Other more easily than western philosophies think and imports what belongs to the Other as his own. How is this possible? Husserl attempted to explain the constitution of the Other by the intentionality that goes from the I to the Other, mediated by the body. However, Husserl later discovered that the constitution of both the I and the Other is more of a two-way movement. This double-movement is essential for all constitutions and departs from a deep (primal) dimension that is not yet egological. Even in the self-reflection of the I, a similar double-movement between the primal and egological dimensions can be seen. The I is supported, but at the same time threatened, by this movement.
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Notes
Nishida (1988, p. 347).
Ibid., p. 390.
Watsuji (1990, p. 11). However, it would need to be examined just how fitting Watsuji’s criticism is of Heidegger, Scheler and Löwith.
Cf. Tani (2002).
Cf. Mach (1886, p. 14).
Husserl may have already had a similar idea before the material came out in Mach’s book, but this cannot be verified.
Translator’s note: Following J.N. Findlay’s translation.
Translator’s note: Following David Carr’s translation.
A kind of passive recollection of the past presents itself in PTSD, that is, without an active participation of the ego. But this is exactly why it is “dangerous” for the ego, because it means a type of functional disorder of the ego (Cf. Tani 2005).
One can find this reading, as Tetsuya Sakakibara showed, in manuscript A V 5. Already in Ideas II, Husserl says “But originally this [personal] Ego is constituted in the genesis pervading the flux of lived experiences” (Hua IV 251 [Translator’s note: Following R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer’s translation]). In the 1930s, Husserl further developed this insight.
The ego first comes into being “latently,” but the latent ego belongs to the “phenomena.”
Not only the form, but also the ground lies before consciousness. In contrast, the ego and primal ego belong to an “internal” structure of consciousness itself. In this sense the structure of form and ground must be given a new meaning “internally.”
Translator’s note: Following F. Kersten’s translation.
Translator’s note: Following James S. Churchill’s translation.
Manuscript AV5, p. 3. Quoted from Held (1966, p. 81).
The concept “mediality” (or “medium”) is developed by Yoshihiro Nitta. Cf. for example, Nitta (2006).
In my opinion, Nishida’s “absolute Other” and Kimura’s “virtuality” are similar to this “universal consciousness.”
Translator’s note: Following Dorian Cairns’ translation.
Translator’s note: Following Dorian Cairns’ translation.
It is well known that Husserl was a genius with analysis, but not with synthesis. We must synthetically treat these two concepts for him.
Bluntly stated, the European tendency of thinking (including psychoanalysis) is “individualistic. In which case, there would be no necessity for the individualistic subject to relate to the Other. In order for some kind of relationship to the Other to exist, the subject would have to have some other tendency: the sexual drive. But in the preliminary level there is in fact already a relationship to the Other. For this reason, the concept of a drive should be re-interpreted.
In the case of schizophrenia, Tadashi Matsuo sees autism as a “scab” that defends against an intrusion of the Other. In relation to the alien, the schizophrenic is too open and hence too vulnerable. Removing the scab too quickly in therapy is actually a type of violence to the patient. One must “wait.” (Cf. Matsuo 1987).
Translator’s note: Following Dorian Cairns’ translation.
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Translator’s note: In this translation, the German prefix “Ur” is translated as primal and not primordial. The variation from traditional translations is used in order to differentiate between Ur (primordial) in a sense that shuts out the relation to the Other and Ur (primal) in a sense that does not shut out this relation. Words like Urauffassung, Ur-Ich, and Urtatsache will thus be translated as “primal apprehension,” “primal ego” and “primal fact” accordingly.
Translated by Matthew Morgan 
SIU, Carbondale, USA
e-mail: mjmorgan@siu.edu
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Tani, T. The ego, the Other and the primal fact. Cont Philos Rev 41, 385–399 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-008-9092-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-008-9092-7