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Varieties of Rigidity

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Abstract

In this paper certain aspects of rigidity are studied through Hintikka’s work in modal semantics. The paper surveys Hintikka’s extraordinary struggles with rigidity from the late 50’s to this millennium. I argue that Hintikka’s many ambivalent remarks concerning rigidity become more comprehensible if, first, three different variants of rigidity are distinguished and, second, Hintikka’s largely implicit doctrine of semantic neo-Kantianism is made explicit.

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Correspondence to Tuukka Tanninen.

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I thank Andreas Fjellstad, Antti Keskinen, and Gabriel Sandu for discussions concerning the topics of this paper, and the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.

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Tanninen, T. Varieties of Rigidity. Log. Univers. 13, 219–240 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-018-0199-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-018-0199-2

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