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An objection to Kantian ethical rationalism

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Bibliography

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University, 63103, St. Louis, MO, USA

    George N. Terzis

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  1. George N. Terzis
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I wish to thank Stephen F. Barker for helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper.

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Terzis, G.N. An objection to Kantian ethical rationalism. Philos Stud 57, 299–313 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372699

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00372699

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