Abstract
An interpretation of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic is proposed which is intuitively graspable, if only formally correst. The individuals to which a term applies, and possibly-applies, are supposed to be determined in a uniform way by the set of individuals to which the term necessarily-applies.
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Thomason, S.K. Relational Models for the Modal Syllogistic* . Journal of Philosophical Logic 26, 129–141 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004200616124
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004200616124