Abstract
This paper resolves the problems raised by Israel Scheffler and Noam Chomsky against Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment. I call Scheffler’s and Chomsky’s problems as (1) the problem of inexorable ontological commitments and (2) the problem of false existential inferences. I extend their problems to a third one, which is called as the problem of extended inexorable ontological commitments to rival entities. In order to present the third problem, two ontological disputes are considered: Russell–Meinong dispute from the context of the referential theory of meaning and David Lewis–Meinong dispute from the context of modal metaphysics. In order to work out a resolution to these three problems, I emphasize the distinction between meta-ontology/meta-theory and object theory. Then, it is explained that there is a functional difference between Quine’s criterion of ontological commitments (meta-theory) and the object theories to which this criterion is applied. Here, considering the functional difference, I introduce different kinds of commitments: direct commitments and indirect commitments. Using Strawson’s views on the notion of presupposition, the distinction between direct commitments and indirect commitments is characterized further. Employing this distinction, I resolve the problem of inexorable ontological commitment to the entities, the problem of false existential inferences and the problems of extended inexorable ontological commitment to the rival entities.
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Notes
Ibid.
One of the reviewers points out that the issue which is mentioned in Quine’s two formulations is about specifying the domain of quantification of Quine and the domain of quantification of McX (Meinogian). Once we have both the domain of Quine and the domain of a Meinongian, then how to provide a rule to legitimately pick up respective substitution instances or how to explain the quantification over the entities in both of their domains? Here, quantification over different kinds of entities could be worked out by accepting two kinds of quantifiers. Graham Priest’s strategy could be considered here. Priest has two kinds of quantification: neutral quantification and loaded quantification. The domain of neutral quantification is the universal domain in which both Quine’s and Meinongian’s entities are the members. This quantification is accomplished by developing two kinds of quantifiers: general quantifier U and particular quantifier Ϭ. General quantifier is represented as “U” and particular quantifier is represented as “Ϭ”. According to Priest Ux (Px & Qx) needs to be read as all objects that are P are Q. And Ϭx (Px & Qx) should be read as some objects that are P are Q. In the loaded quantification, there are two quantifiers: Universal “∀” and particular “∃”. According to Priest ∀x (Px & Qx) needs to be read as all existent objects that are P are Q. And ∃x (Px & Qx) should be read as some existent objects that are P are Q. Using Priest method the quantification could be performed upon both Quine’s domain and Meinong’s domain (See Priest 2018).
There are idioms of quantification in natural language which can be represented in a formal language. In natural language such idioms are stated as “there are something”, “there exist things” and “something”. These idioms in natural language can be represented in formal language through the quantifier variable idiom (Q–V–I) of the first-order-quantificational/predicate logic to talk about the entities. So, we have got the existential quantifier “(∃)”, the variable “x” and the predicate expressions. The variable “x” stands for an entity and is attached to “(∃)” and thus it is a bound variable, and the predicate expressions are represented by using capital letters which are attached to the bound variable. For example, consider the sentence which is expressed in natural language: there are tigers. Under the method of quantification, this sentence is given the following formal representation: (∃x) Tx.
The notion of reference is to be taken seriously. Frank Jackson regards QCOC as referential criterion of ontological commitment, since variables are regarded as referring to some entities. See Jackson (1980). “Ontological Commitment and Paraphrase.” Philosophy 55 (213), 303–315.
But then, variable referring an entity cannot be just regarded as referring to existing entities alone. Consider, Meinongian ontology, they will be having intentional entities too which do not exist, but merely subsist. As QCOC is a meta-theory, and if this meta-theory is applicable to other object theories then variable referring to intentional entities is to be explicated. The notion of reference requires some adequate explanations in QCOC. But this has to be worked out separately and need not be an issue to be considered here.
The notion of reference is to be taken seriously. Frank Jackson regards QCOC as referential criterion of ontological commitment, since variables are regarded as referring to some entities. See, Jackson (1980). “Ontological Commitment and Paraphrase.” Philosophy 55 (213), 303–315.
But then, variable referring an entity cannot be just regarded as referring to existing entities alone. Consider, Meinongian ontology, they will be having intentional entities too which do not exist, but merely subsist. As QCOC is a meta-theory, and if this meta-theory is to be applied to other object theories then variable referring to intentional entities is to be explicated. The notion of reference requires some adequate explanations in QCOC. But this has to be worked out separately and need not be an issue to be considered here.
Applicability of QCOC can be explained by considering the sixth formulation of the criterion. Once, what is said in the left side of the connective (regarding theory T and its entities E) obtains, then what is said in the right side will also obtain. This criterion does not work just in case, what is said in one of the sides does not hold, whereas the other side holds. If the violation of this criterion cannot be thought of, then this criterion can be used to fix the ontological commitments of the theory T. The applicability of this criterion is that to what a theory is committed can be determined by converting the sentences of the theory T to Q–V–Idioms and by looking into the existentially bound variables of those Q–V–Idioms. Following questions could be asked. If we want to fix the ontological commitments of a theory, just look into the theory and find out what the theory says what is real, why do we need or bring QCOC in order to fix the ontological commitments? This could be responded in the following way. If a theory is committed to certain entities, then inevitably those entities to which that theory is committed will be kept as the value of existentially bound variable. If so, we just need to look into the bound variable and see what entities would be the values of that bound variable. This aspect can be extended further to show what a particular theory is committed to which is considered as the applicability of this criterion. This applicability is achieved in the following two steps.
1. Regiment the sentences of the theories into Q–V–Idioms.
2. Determine what the existentially bound variable “x” stands for.
Consider theory T* and the entities of T*. Consider that theory T* is a false theory. The very falsity of the theory T* does not preclude QCOC from being applicable to T* in the sense that how can QCOC stop itself in saying that “T* is committed to the entities of the sort E*”.
According to the phlogiston theory which is a superseded scientific theory, there is something called phlogiston which is a fire-like element and phlogiston is contained within things that can burn and is actually released during the burning process. Any object that can burn in fact contain the substance phlogiston. This theory was proposed by Johann Becher in 1669 and was proved to be wrong by Antoine Lavoisier in the 1770s.
Ibid.
Here the identity criterion also plays a role. Based on the identity criterion it can be said that phlogiston lacks clear identity. Since the phlogiston fails to satisfy the identity criterion, phlogiston should not be posited.
Using deduction, a justification for inconsistency is provided in the Appendix.
Here, some cases mean when QCOC is applied to the cases of true theories. When we say that QCOC assumes the entities of the true theories, we do not find much problem, unlike when we say that QCOC assumes the entities of the false theories.
Some other cases stand for those cases when QCOC is applied to the false theories. Consider for example the phlogiston theory. Phlogiston theory is a false obsolete scientific theory which assumed that a fire-like element called phlogiston is contained within combustible bodies and released during combustion. However, the applicability of QCOC to this theory leads to QCOC being committed to something that is phlogiston.
Let us call any similar kind of claims or statement which results in the light of QCOC as the meta-ontological claims regarding that particular theory. Some examples for such sentences would be the following: “theory T is committed to entities of the sort…”, “theory T assumes certain entities of the sort…”, etc.
However, a thorough enquiry is to be made on answering what are the variables and what are the entities of QCOC.
Russellians would refer to the entities of Meinong, if Russellians were to state the ontological disagreement with Meinong in the following way. There are entities to which Meinongians are committed whereas we Russellians are not committed to such entities. This way of stating the disagreement would make the Russellians to accept the entities of Meinongians in the ontology of Russellians. First the Russellians have to accept the reality of certain Meinongian entities and deny the reality of these entities in such cases the Russellians are referring to certain Meinongian entities. In doing so the Russellians are contradicting themselves. Therefore, Russellians cannot allow its bound variable to refer to the entities of Meinongians when Russellians make their ontological disagreement with Meinongians.
Meinongians accept the reality of intentional entities which a Lewisian would not. A Lewisian accepts the reality of flesh and blood talking donkeys or any similar entity which a Meinongian would not. This will put both on the negative side when they make ontological disagreement.
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Appendix
Appendix
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Proving the inconsistency using derivation method
(2) (∃x) (x is assumed by “(∃x) Px”& x is phlogiston)
(3) (x) (y) ((x is assumed by “(∃x) Px”& y is phlogiston) → (x = y))
(4) (∃x) (y) (x is assumed by “∃x Px” & ~ (y is phlogiston))
Axb = x is assumed by “(∃x)Px”
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{(∃x) (Axb & Px), (x) (y) ((Axb & Py) → (x = y)), (∃x) (y) (Axb & ~Py)}
(1) | (∃x) (Axb & Px) | Set member (SM) |
(2) | (x) (y) ((Axb & Py) → (x = y)) | (SM) |
(3) | (∃x) (y) (Axb & ~Py) | (SM) |
(4) | Acb & Pc | 1, Existential elimination |
(5) | Pc | 4, Simplification |
(6) | (y) (Aeb & ~Py) | 3, Existential elimination |
(7) | Aeb& ~Pc | 6, Universal elimination |
(8) | ~Pc | 7, Simplification |
X |
Since we can arrive at the contradiction in the derivation (Pc & ~Pc) line 5 and line 8, the set is inconsistent.
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Thomas, J. Resolving Scheffler and Chomsky’s Problems on Quine’s Criterion of Ontological Commitments. J. Indian Counc. Philos. Res. 36, 229–245 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-019-00174-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40961-019-00174-6