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Notes
Patrick Todd, “A New Approach to Manipulation Arguments,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 153, No. 1, (2011), pp. 127–133.
In Todd’s version of the manipulation argument, though an agent meets compatibilist conditions for responsibility, readers are asked to what extent that agent is blameworthy for his or her behavior. One possible compatibilist retort to this argument is to contend that the concepts of responsibility and blameworthiness can come apart—an agent can be responsible without being blameworthy. While I think this is an interesting strategy to take, for the purposes of this essay, I will accept the assumption that an agent who is not blameworthy is also not responsible.
Andrew Khoury, “Manipulation and Mitigation,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 168, No. 1, (2014), pp. 283–294.
Justin Capes, “Mitigating Soft Compatibilism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 87, No. 3, (2013), pp. 640–663 and Hannah Tierney, “A Maneuver around the Modified Manipulation Argument,” Philosophical Studies, Vol. 165, No. 3, (2013), pp. 753–763.
Michael McKenna, “A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 77, No. 1, (2008), p. 143.
Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 1, (1971), pp. 5–20 and John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: An Essay on moral Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
Derk Pereboom, Living Without Free Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 113–114.
See A.J. Ayer, “Freedom and necessity,” Philosophical Essays (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1954), pp. 3–20; R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”; John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: An Essay on Moral Responsibility.
Pereboom, Living Without Free Will, p. 115.
McKenna, “A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.”
Ibid.
Ibid.
Todd, “A New Approach to Manipulation Arguments,” p. 129.
Q2* does not appear in Todd’s “A New Approach to Manipulation Arguments;” it is a reconstruction of his reasoning on pp. 130–131.
Ibid., p. 132.
Ibid., p. 131, emphasis in original.
Khoury, “Manipulation and Mitigation.”
Ibid., p. 292.
Ibid., pp. 292–293.
Ibid., p. 292.
McKenna, “A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument,” p. 148.
Khoury, “Manipulation and Mitigation,” p. 294.
Ibid.
Ibid., 155.
Khoury, “Manipulation and Mitigation,” 294.
Ibid., p. 292.
Capes, “Mitigating Soft Compatibilism” and Tierney, “A Maneuver Around the Manipulation Argument.”
Todd, “Manipulation and Moral Standing: An Argument for Incompatibilism,” Philosophers’ Imprint, Vol. 12, No. 7, (2012).
Tierney, “A Maneuver Around the Modified Manipulation Argument,” p. 760.
Thanks to Matthew Flummer for pointing this out.
Ibid., p. 132.
McKenna, “A Hard-Line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument,” p. 155.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Michael McKenna, Carolina Sartorio, and Shaun Nichols for their helpful feedback and suggestions. I would also like to thank Matthew Flummer for his valuable comments and the audience at Florida State University’s Graduate Conference on Free Will and Moral Responsibility for an excellent discussion of an earlier draft of this paper.
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Tierney, H. Tackling it Head On: How Best to Handle the Modified Manipulation Argument. J Value Inquiry 48, 663–675 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9461-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10790-014-9461-x