Abstract
Why should we respect the privacy of donors of biological material? The question is answered in the present article in general philosophical terms from the point of view of an ethics of honour, a libertarian theory of rights, a view of respect for privacy based on the idea that autonomy is of value in itself, and utilitarianism respectively. For different reasons the ethics of honour and the idea of the value of autonomy are set to one side. It surfaces that the moral rights theory and utilitarianism present conflicting answers to the question. The main thrust of the argument is that there is no way of finding an overlapping consensus, so politicians have to take decisions that are bound to be controversial in that they can be questioned on reasonable philosophical grounds.
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Notes
In this overview of possibilities I rely on my own forthcoming 'Applied Ethics. A Defence'. I there defend the use of the method. In the present context I just use it
In my book, Understanding Ethics 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP/Columbia UP, 2009) I discuss these views at length. But that is a book, not a brief article for a philosophical journal.
See his ‘The Two Western Cultures of Privacy. Dignity Versus Liberty’, The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 113, 2004 from which I quote.
I quote from her ‘The Right to Privacy’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 4, 1975, pp. 295–314.
I’googled’ the phrase and found more than 100,000 instances.
For an illumination account of the distinction between picking and choosing, see Ullmann-Margalit E. and Morgenbesser, S. (1977), 'Picking and Choosing', Social Research, 44, pp. 757–85.
I here rely on my Coercive Care (London and New York: Routledge, 1999). In the book I elaborate on all the conditions. Here it must suffice with a rough statement of them.
The distinction between criteria of rightness and methods of decision-making was first clearly made in Bales, E., 'Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?' American Philosophical Quarterly Vol. VII, 1971, pp. 256–65. In one form or another all adherents of act-utilitarianism today accept it.
In Sweden the PKU register is an example of this kind of storing of genetic material. The word ‘register’, however, is a misnomer. The PKU register is a collection of blood samples from all infants; a forensic register used only for identification of individuals could be kept on a computer (only) and would hence be much cheaper.
I write more about this general problem in ‘Why No Compromise is Possible’, Metaphilosophy, Vol. 38, pp. 330–343, 2007, reprinted in Lori Gruen, Laura Grabel, and Peter Singer (eds), Stem Cell Research: The Ethical Issues (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007).
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This article has been written in connection with the European research project TissEU. Tiss.EU stands for ‘Evaluation of Legislation and Related Guidelines on the Procurement, Storage and Transfer of Human Tissues and Cells in the European Union—an Evidence-Based Impact Analysis.’ The project has been funded by the European Commission as part of the 7th Framework Programme. I thank all the participants in the project for valuable comments on my paper, which was presented in a preliminary form at a conference with the project in Stockholm on 25 March 2010.
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Tännsjö, T. Why should we respect the privacy of donors of biological material?. Med Health Care and Philos 14, 43–52 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-010-9292-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-010-9292-x