Abstract
This chapter concentrates on Peter Olivi’s (ca. 1248–98) theory of the ontological foundations of political power—and, by extension, property and other social institutions. After briefly presenting his view of political power as a relation between a ruler and his subjects (which he presents in his famous Quid ponat ius), the chapter focuses more generally on Olivi’s theory of relations. Drawing from previous works by Alain Boureau, Sylvain Piron, Christian Rode, Robert Pasnau and others, it explores the ontology of relations and endeavors to shed new light on this notoriously difficult aspect of Olivi’s philosophy. A special focus is placed on the non-Aristotelian notion of rationes reales, which Olivi uses to make room between realism and nominalism, as he argues that power relations are real (i.e. they are not mind-dependent) although they are not based on any real properties in the relata. After showing that political power and other institutional facts must be understood in light of this peculiar ontological notion, the final section of the essay argues that the freedom of the human will entails an ability to change social reality. It is also suggested that despite this rather modern aspect of Olivi’s his social ontology, he remains firmly within medieval worldview by grounding the normative aspect of social institutions in the will of God.
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Notes
- 1.
The terms ‘social institutions’ and ‘institutional facts’ that I use in this chapter are not present in Olivi’s works as such, and they should be understood in a broad sense without presupposing any strong ontological theory behind them. As is well–known, the latter term is popularized by Searle (1995).
- 2.
Also see Claudia Appolloni’s contribution in this volume for further analysis of Olivi’s theory of signification and its connection to the normative use of language within a given linguistic community.
- 3.
- 4.
Ebbesen (2016, 209–15) has shown that medieval authors sometimes use habitudo, as distinct from relatio, to avoid ontological commitments. Olivi seems to use these terms as synonyms.
- 5.
Olivi does not develop a political theory in the context of QPI, so he does not commit himself to any particular type of constitution.
- 6.
Olivi, QPI: ‘[…] quia relatio que nichil ponit in aliquo extremorum est solum relatio secundum dici, et idem est respectu extremi in quo nichil ponit; huiusmodi autem relationes nullo modo sunt actu nisi solum in cogitante et quamdiu cogitantur vel dicuntur; constat autem quod potestas regia aut quecumque vera iurisdictio vel obligatio sive servitus aliquorum est vere actu, quamvis hoc non cogitetur vel dicatur a nobis; ergo ipsa extra nostrum cogitatum et dictum ponit aliquid reale’ (2016, par. 7), the translations of QPI are mine, although I have consulted John P. Doyle’s unpublished draft from 1987.
- 7.
Olivi, QPI: ‘Ager enim Petri, quod adquisivit ei ius emptionis, habet solum relationem possesionis respectu Petri, et quando per venditionem vel dationem transfertur a Petro in Paulum, quid aliud perdit nisi solam relationem possessionis vel proprietatis ad Petrum? Videtur igitur quod huiusmodi relationes nullum reale fundamentum habeant in hiis quorum esse dicuntur’ (2016, par. 21).
- 8.
Olivi, QPI: ‘[…] predicte habitudines vere ponunt aliquid reale, non tamen addunt aliquam diversam essentiam realiter informantem illa subiecta quorum et in quibus esse dicuntur’ (2016, par. 30). Alain Boureau (1999, 51) has pointed out that Olivi uses the same idea (transferring ownership to others does not entail any ontological change) when he discusses Christ as the redeemer of the humankind in Summa III; see Olivi, Summa III, q. 2 (1981, 111).
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
On categories: see esp. Olivi, Summa II, q. 28 (1922, 482–98; q. 14, 264; q. 16, 333–34; Olivi, Quodl. (2002b, 174 ad1). Note, however, that according to Pasnau (2011, 247–49), Olivi’s ontology contains modes in addition to substances and qualities, and he argues that at least some categories should be understood as modes.
- 12.
Olivi, Summa II, q. 28: ‘Praeterea, secundum istos relatio nihil addit ad ea super quae immediate fundatur’ (1922, 488). See also Olivi, Summa II, q. 9: ‘[…] non poterat esse sola relatio, quoniam illa non advenit nec recedit nisi per adventum et recessum alicuius absoluti in quo fundatur […]’ (1922, 182); and Olivi, Summa II q. 28, and q. 54 (respectively, 1922, 494–95, and 1924, 260–61), where Olivi argues that several impossible consequences would follow if relations were absolute properties (a relation would have a relation to its foundation etc. ad infinitum; God could destroy a relation without changing anything in the relata). These were typical arguments against a realist interpretation of relations (Henninger 1989, 9–10). Relations can be grounded both on the substance and on its accidents: Olivi, Summa II q. 54: ‘[…] potest dici quod quaedam sunt relationes accidentales substantiis seu rebus substantialibus, quaedam vero substantiales, ut illas dicamus relationes accidentales substantiis quae non fundatur immediate super aliquod substantiale, sed super aliquod accidens, illas vero substantiales quae immediate fundantur super aliquod substantiale’ (1924, 260).
- 13.
- 14.
Olivi does not explicitly say that relatio secundum dici is identical with relation of reason. However, to the best of my knowledge he does not use the latter concept, and his characterizations of relatio secundum dici use the same examples that were typically used to explain relations of reason; e.g. Olivi, Summa II, q. 14: ‘[…] etiam secundum Aristotelem scibile seu scitum non dicit relationem ad scientiam, etiam in quantum scibile, nisi secundum dici; id autem quod est scibile, secundum id quod est, nullo modo. Et eodem modo est de diligibili seu dilecto. Ratio igitur intelligibilis seu scibilis et ratio ipsius appetibilis seu diligibilis, in quantum talia, dicunt relationes secundum dici solum’ (1922, 260, punctuation slightly modified; see also footnote 17 below).
- 15.
Olivi, Summa II, q. 54: ‘[…] non videtur quod relatio aliquid reale addat ad illud super quod immediate fundatur, sed solum dicit eiusdem alteram rationem realem, realem vero pro tanto, quia vere est in re talis ratio relationis et non solum in intellectu, non tamen alteram realiter, hoc est, quod sit altera res vel essentia, sed solum altera ratio in re per omnimodam indifferentiam comprehensa’ (1924, 260; trans. Pasnau 2011, 236, modified).
- 16.
Olivi, Summa II, q. 54: ‘Dixi autem rationum realium, quia quaedam rationes sunt rebus attributae quae nihil dicunt reale seu a parte rei, sed solum a parte intellectus seu secundum intellectum’ (1924, 247). For discussion, see Bettoni (1959, 236–43); Piron (1999, chapter 2); Piron (2016, par. 7–9).
- 17.
Olivi, Summa II, q. 7: ‘[…] qui dicebant quod non solum in Deo, sed etiam in rebus creatis videntur esse plures rationes reales absque omni differentia. Vocant autem rationem realem ad differentiam rationum quae in solis modis intelligendi consistunt, sicut est ratio universalitatis quam intellectus attribuit naturis rerum absque earum individuatione apprehensis et sicut sunt relationes secundum dici quae in neutro extremorum aut saltem in altero eorum nihil ponunt, ut laudari et amari passive accepta nihil ponunt in ipso laudato et amato. Ad differentiam igitur istarum vocant rationes reales illas quarum veritas plenarie est in re, ita quod ex modo intelligendi vario non attribuuntur rebus, sed potius ex ipsa natura et veritate reali […]’ (1922, 134–35).
- 18.
Olivi, Summa II, q. 7: ‘Ad quintum dicunt quod si definitio sumatur secundum modum logicum qui sequitur modum nostri intellectus potius quam modum ipsius rei, tunc minor est falsa, quia sic, sicut possumus rem diversimode intelligere, sic et diversimode definire. Si tamen daretur una ratio includens in se totam plenitudinem essentiae et omnes modos intelligibilitatis eius, talis ratio non posset plurificari; nihilominus tamen haberet intra se plures rationes partiales, quia continet in se omnes rationes rei; de sola autem tali potest verificari quod unius rei non est nisi unica definitio, quamvis tali definitioni non conveniret omnino ars definitionum quae datur ab Aristotele, VI Topicorum [6.1, 139a24ff]’ (1922, 144; see also p. 143–44). Olivi, Summa II, q. 54: ‘[…] definitio non sit aliud quam ratio rei […]’ (1924, 262).
- 19.
It should be noted that the precise ontological status of rationes reales is unclear. Giorgio Pini seems to read Olivi as a reductionist: ‘[…] a ratio is an aspect of an extramental thing that does not exist as an independent item before our mind abstracts it from other aspects within the same thing’ (Pini 2005, 75). Sylvain Piron defends a similar (but not necessarily the same) interpretation: ‘Leur pluralité n’implique pourtant aucune diversité d’essence, mais uniquement une aptitude ou des dispositions [habitudines] à être intelligées selon différentes considerations’ (Piron 2016, par. 7; see Olivi, Summa II, q. 13 (1922, 251)). In contrast, Robert Pasnau suggests that they should be understood of as modes of being of the things to which they belong, i.e. ‘entities that fall in between mere structures and full-blown res’ (Pasnau 2011, 237; see also ibid., 247–49), but he acknowledges that it is unclear whether relations are modes or not (ibid., 248n4). One way to capture what Olivi has in mind is to say that they are real ontological additions to Socrates and his subjects but not ontological additions that can be found in Aristotelian metaphysics (I thank Christian Rode for this suggestion). Understood in this way, Olivi’s remarks to the effect that they do not add any essence or thing should not be taken in the sense that they do not add anything at all. Yet, Olivi’s strong emphasis in QPI that nothing really changes in Socrates and his subjects can be taken to entail that the change is not ontological, not even in any non–Aristotelian sense. One possibility is that Olivi did not fully develop the ontology of rationes reales. He needed them for certain purposes and by positing them he distanced himself from the Aristotelian framework without going through the pains of developing a detailed account of their ontological status.
- 20.
Olivi, Summa I, q. 6: ‘Quando enim dicimus quod rationes in quantum tales non sunt eedem rationes, non intendimus simpliciter significare per hoc quin sint simpliciter eadem res et quin sint realiter omnino idem, sed intendimus significare per hoc quod nulla earum in quantum talis dicit divinam essentiam secundum totalitatem sue perfectionis seu secundum totam suam significatam. Unde omnes dicunt idem totum sed nulla earum dicit idem totaliter. Defectum ergo totalitatis seu totalis significationis qui per alias rationes suppletur intendimus significare per hoc quod dicimus quod una ratio est non est alia et quod non sunt eedem sed diverse. Sensus enim est: una non est alia, idest una non dicit illud totalitatis quod alia dicit’ (2020, 6.2, par. 130). See also Olivi, Summa II, q. 7; q. 13 (1922, 143; 248–49); Olivi (2016, par. 7).
- 21.
Olivi, Summa II, q. 5 (1922, 120).
- 22.
Olivi, Summa I q. 2: ‘Quando enim in una simplici essentia duae rationes comprehenduntur, illa essentia potest intelligi secundum unam illarum rationum, non intelligendo eam secundum alteram, quamvis secundum totam intelligibilitatem suam non intelligatur, nisi intelligatur secundum omnes rationes suas quas habet’ (1926, 497–98 (= ed. Jansen, q. 1)). See also Rode (2014, 379–80).
- 23.
Olivi explains that there are three kinds of ‘addition’: (1) addition that requires a real ontological difference between the things that are added to each other; (2) addition that requires a difference between rationes reales; (3) addition that is based only on how we think about things: secundum intellectum nostrum. He writes in Summa II, q. 12: ‘[…] distinctionem differentiae et additionis <1> realium essentiarum aut <2> rationum realium aut <3> rationum in solo intellectu existentium […]. Dixerunt enim quod quaedam est additio secundum rem implicans realem differentiam inter id quod additur et id cui additur, ita quod realiter habent diversas essentias […]. Alia est additio rationis realis ad rationem realem nullam implicans realem differentiam seu aliquam diversitatem essentiarum; unde nec proprie nec simpliciter dicitur additio, sed solum secundum quid. […] in eadem essentia per omnimodam indifferentiam istae rationes comprehenduntur, et hoc realiter et non solum secundum modum intelligendi nostrum. […] de aliquo obiecto aliquando scito, aliquando ignorato aut contrarie opinato; et idem de aliquando dilecto et laudato, aliquando odio habito et vituperato; non enim ponunt aliquam diversitatem rationum in ipsis obiectis nisi secundum modum intelligendi tantum’ (1922, 226–27; emphasis mine).
- 24.
Olivi explicitly refers to QPI in Summa, when he explains rationes reales: Olivi, Summa II q. 7: ‘Et consimiliter habet locum in tota materia iuris, an scilicet iurisdictio regalis vel sacerdotalis vel iurisdictio cuiuscunque dominii vel proprietatis addat aliquid ad personas in quibus est huiusmodi iurisdictio vel ad res super quas habetur’ (1922, 136).
- 25.
This topic has been discussed in more detail in Toivanen (2016, 26–44).
- 26.
Olivi, QPI: ‘Quia igitur huiusmodi potestas nichil intrinsecus realiter addit ad personam regis, idcirco potest sic respicere totam eius personam quod non respiciet determinate aliquam eius partem, nisi forte liberum arbitrium et potentias ei subnexas in quantum tales […]’ (2016, par. 53).
- 27.
Olivi, QPI: ‘Rursus, sciendum quod licet actus creature rationalis transeant, nichilominus per illos potest acquirere quamdam rationem respectivam, nove scilicet habitudinis et novi ordinis, nullo alio addito preter actum: cuius ratio est, quia tam a se quam ab omni alia mente rationali potest ex tunc vere intelligi talem actum fecisse vel in se habuisse, ac per consequens potest et debet haberi pro auctore vel subiecto actus preteriti, et pro tali et pro quali debet haberi actor talis actus, quia sibi per talem actum nullo alio sibi addito acquirit novum respectum ad ipsum actum et ad reliqua per intermedium actum. Idcirco, nullo alio sibi addito, per solos actus pretereuntes potest creatura rationalis acquirere habitudines meriti et demeriti et iuris vel debiti, non solum apud Deum, sed etiam respectu omnis creature rationalis; iuxta quod omnis mens rationalis sub alia ratione debet accipere eum qui peccavit pro quanto peccavit quam eum qui nunquam peccavit, et aliter eum qui aliquid vovit quam eum qui nichil vovit’ (2016, par. 45).
- 28.
Olivi, Summa II q. 7: ‘[…] facere enim relationes non est aliud quam facere illa in quibus fundantur […]’ (1922, 138).
- 29.
- 30.
Olivi, QPI: ‘[…] potestas regis vel quecumque alia consimilis vocatur potestas, non quia ad modum potentiarum activarum ex se influat et imprimat actiones in aliquo patienti, sed potius quia ex ordine divine et humane voluntatis et iustitie, preceptum datum a rege habet talem vim quod homines sui regni tenentur obedire’ (2016, par. 53).
- 31.
Olivi, QPI: ‘Preterea, istud fit per solas causas voluntates interiores et voces exteriores, exteriores non quidem in quantum sunt naturaliter efficaces et fortes, sed solum in quantum sunt voluntaria signa voluntatis interne; sed per non hoc non videntur posse effici tot potestates et habitudines quot innumeris hominibus dantur et acquiruntur per sola verba et per solos consensus verbis expressos’ (2016, par. 10; Rode 2014, 376–78).
- 32.
- 33.
I would like to thank the participants of the conference Contemporary and Medieval Social Ontologies for their suggestions and discussions. This research has been funded by the Academy of Finland.
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Toivanen, J. (2023). Ontology of Power Relations in Peter Olivi. In: Pelletier, J., Rode, C. (eds) The Reality of the Social World. Historical-Analytical Studies on Nature, Mind and Action, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23984-7_3
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