Goading or Guiding? Cognitivism, Non-Cognitivism, and Practical Reasoning

Abstract

One of the main goals of this paper is to introduce the idea that a metaethical theory of the nature of normative judgment must be compatible with a plausible account of the reasons for which we act when we act on the basis of our normative judgments. Another main goal of the paper is to argue that when we try to satisfy this desideratum for a metaethical theory, we notice that cognitivism faces a challenge that non-cognitivism elegantly sidesteps. If cognitivism is true, then it is hard to explain how someone could perform an action, φ, on the basis of her judgment that she ought to φ, and thereby for the reasons that one might sensibly take to explain why she ought to φ. If we accept non-cognitivism, no similar problem arises. This, I claim, gives us a reason to prefer non-cognitivism over cognitivism. But even if someone does not find this argument against cognitivism and in favor of non-cognitivism entirely convincing, she might agree that the more general point is deserving of more attention than it has attracted in the past. I close with an attempt to deal with some possible criticisms.