Perceptual Experience and Its Contents
Abstract
The contents of perceptual experience, it has been argued, often include a
characteristic “non-conceptual” component (Evans, 1982). Rejecting such
views, McDowell (1994) claims that such contents are conceptual in every
respect. It will be shown that this debate is compromised by the failure of both
sides to mark a further, and crucial, distinction in cognitive space. This is the
distinction between what is doubted here as mindful and mindless modes of
perceiving: a distinction which cross-classifies the conceptual / non-conceptual
divide. The goal of the paper is to show that there can be both mindful personal
level perceptual experiences whose content cannot be considered conceptual —
pace McDowell (1994)— and that there are mindless personal level perceptual
experiences whose content cannot be considered —pace Evans (1982)— nonconceptual.
The resulting picture yields a richer four dimensional carving of the
space of perceptual experience, and provides a better framework in which to
accommodate the many subtleties involved in our sensory confrontations with
the world.