Abstract
The paper deals with the role of the faculty of judgement in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. It provides an interpretation of the role of the „Typic“ of the faculty of pure practical judgment and the categories of freedom in the constitution of the object of the will. For Kant, the object of the will is, properly speaking, a maxim. It is argued that in the second chapter of the Critique two notions of object and, thus, of maxim are used: one corresponding to the pure practical reason (a second-order maxim) and the other to the empirically conditioned practical reason (a first-order maxim). The object of the will (i. e. of the pure practical reason) is a second-order maxim, to which Kant also sometimes refers as inner attitude (Gesinnung). The categories of freedom provide the necessary knowledge in order to a priori assess any possible maxim. In particular, the „Typic“ allows the moral modality ofamaxim to be determined, that is,whether it is morally possible or not. In this way, pure reason meets one of the essential requirements of autonomy: to constitute by itself the object ofawill determined by the moral law. It is then justified to conceive the causality of the will independently of its matter.
