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Non-monotonic Logic and the Compatibility of Science and Religion

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Abstract

The article aims to show how the acceptance of non-monotonic logic enables arguments to be held between science and religion in a way that does not exclude either of these two spheres. The starting point of the analyses is the idea of the 13th century Danish philosopher, Boethius of Dacia, who states that it is both acceptable that: (1) a natural scientist negates that the world had a beginning, and (2) a Christian theologian asserts that the world had a beginning, because each of them is basing their statements on the principles of their respective discipline: the first on the principles of nature, and the latter on knowledge supplemented by divine revelation. What is more, analogically: (3) a metaphysician, when limited to his principles, cannot settle the issue, as he takes into account supranatural beings and their powers, but cannot know what God or another powerful supranatural would have decided in a such a case. The paper shows that Boethius’s approach: (1) violates the rule of monotonicity, (2) cannot be finally interpreted in terms of classical logic and (3) assumes certain non-monotonic logic as its inference framework. Other presented examples of arguments between religious beliefs and the statements of natural science are resolved in the same way. Thus, it is shown how non-monotonic thinking allows us to seriously treat both scientific and religious inference as compatible.

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Notes

  1. Also called Boethius of Denmark or de Dacia or Boethius Dacus or Dacius; perhaps this name is a latinised form of the Danish “Bo”, as Ebbesen remarks [4].

  2. Of course this opinion might be revisited from the point of view of paraconsistent logics.

  3. [2, pp. 46–48]: “(...) volentes sententiam christianae fidei de aeternitate mundi et sententiam Aristotelis et quorundam aliorum philosophorum reducere ad concordiam, ut sententia fidei firmiter teneatur quamquam in quibusdam demonstrari non possit (...). (...) eorum sententia in nullo contradicit christianae fidei nisi apud non intelligentes; sententia enim philosophorum innititur demonstrationibus et ceteris rationibus possibilibus in rebus de quibus loquuntur, fides autem in multis, innititur miraculis et non rationibus: quod enim tenetur propter hoc quod per rationes conclusum est, non est fides sed scientia—et ut appareat quod fides et philosophia sibi non contradicunt de aeternitate mundi, ut etiam appareat quod rationes quorundam haereticorum non habent vigorem, per quas contra christianam fidem mundum tenent esse aeternum, de hoc per rationem inquiramus, scilicet utrum mundus sit aeternus”.

  4. [2, p. 70]: “prima est: quod nullus artifex potest aliquid causare, concedere vel negare nisi ex principiis suae scientiae. Secunda suppositio est: quod, quamvis natura non sit primum principium simpliciter, est tamen primum principium in genere rerum naturalium, et primum principium quod naturalis considerare potest”.

  5. [2, pp. 72–74]: “Ex his apparet manifeste quod naturalis non potest ponere aliquem motum novum, nisi ipsum praecedat aliquis motus qui sit causa eius. Ergo, cum necesse sit in mundo ponere aliquem motum primum—non enim contingit abire in infinitum in motibus quorum unus sit causa alterius—sequitur quod naturalis ex sua scientia et suis principiis, quibus ipse utitur, non potest ponere primum motum novum. (...) Ergo nec naturalis potest ponere mundum novum, cum mobile primum non praecessit mundum in duratione”.

  6. [2, p. 74]: “Ex hoc etiam contingit manifeste, si quis diligenter inspexerit quae iam diximus, quod naturalis creationem considerare non potest. Natura enim omnem suum effectum facit ex subiecto et materia. Factio autem ex subiecto et materia generatio est et non creatio”.

  7. [2, p. 78]: “Unde conclusio in qua naturalis dicit mundum et primum motum non esse novum accepta absolute falsa est, sed si referatur in rationes et principia ex quibus ipse eam concludit, ex illis sequitur”.

  8. [2, p. 80]: “Sic ergo patent duo: unum est quod naturalis non contradicit christianae fidei de aeternitate mundi, et aliud est quod per rationes naturales non potest ostendi mundum et motum primum esse novum”.

  9. See examples of applying such logics to theological utterances: [1, 11].

  10. Boeth de Dacia, De aet., 7: “Si autem opponas, cum haec sit veritas christianae fidei et etiam veritas simpliciter quod mundus sit novus et non aeternus, et quod creatio sit possibilis, et quod primus homo erat, et quod homo mortuus redibit vivus sine generatione et idem numero, et quod ille idem homo in numero qui iam ante erat corruptibilis, erit incorruptibilis, et sic in una specie atoma erunt istae duae differentiae corruptibile et incorruptibile...”.

  11. Arist., Met., XII, 1069a.

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  1. Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927, Warsaw, Poland

    Marcin Trepczyński

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Correspondence to Marcin Trepczyński.

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Trepczyński, M. Non-monotonic Logic and the Compatibility of Science and Religion. Log. Univers. 13, 457–466 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11787-019-00230-4

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