Abstract
The claim that skeptical theism induces moral paralysis or aporia (known as the moral paralysis objection) has been extensively discussed. In this context, Stephen Maitzen has introduced the Alien Doctor Analogy, an intriguing case that he employs to advance the moral paralysis objection. Michael Rea, however, has criticized the analogy for portraying the skeptical theist uncharitably. In this essay, I argue that Maitzen and Rea are both incorrect: the Alien Doctor Analogy is flawed indeed, but because it portrays the skeptical theist too charitably. I modify the analogy to remedy this flaw. I then use the analogy to advance an original version of the moral paralysis objection. Specifically, I contend that skeptical theists, whenever they encounter apparently gratuitous evil that they could prevent, should be convinced by what I call the “God-Knows-Best Argument,” which always concludes that they should refrain from intervening. Thus, skeptical theism does induce moral paralysis.
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Notes
See Rowe (1979, p. 336).
See Bergmann (2001, p. 279).
See Rea (2013, p. 483).
See Almeida and Oppy (2003, pp. 507–508).
See Bergmann and Rea (2005, p. 248).
See Maitzen (2009, p. 101; 2013, p. 556). Note: The original analogy by Maitzen involved a ‘tribesman’, a depiction that, while it served the intended philosophical purpose at the time, could today be seen as offensive. In light of this, I have replaced the ‘tribesman’ with an ‘astronaut’ and the human ‘doctor’ with an ‘alien doctor’. This revised analogy is structurally identical to the original and serves the same philosophical function, merely changing the context and characters. While Maitzen’s original commentary and his exchange with Rea were based on the original analogy, I am assuming that their discussions apply equally to the revised version, given the structural and philosophical parallels.
Thanks to Kent Staley for pointing out this objection.
Thanks to Chris Hauser for pointing out this objection.
See Plantinga (1977, p. 28).
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Tucker, L. Reconsidering the Alien Doctor Analogy: a challenge to skeptical theism. Int J Philos Relig 94, 213–223 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-023-09878-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-023-09878-x