Abstract
A number of thinkers suggest that, given certain conditions, it’s possible that any concrete human nature could have been united hypostatically to the second Person of the Trinity. Oliver Crisp argues that a potency to have been possibly hypostatically united to the Logos is an important part of what it means for a human person to be made in the image of God. Against this line of reasoning, and building on an argument in print by Andrew Jaeger, I argue two things: first, that many metaphysics of human persons on offer fail to allow the Logos possibly to unite hypostatically to just any concrete human nature. And this is because, given the necessity of identity (if x = y, necessarily x = y), every metaphysics that deploys an identity relation between a human person and her human nature or some essential component of her human nature fails to allow concrete human natures to be identical to any other person than they in fact are or else to lack some essential component that is identical to any other person than it in fact is. And, in the Incarnation, the Logos does not unite with a person. Second, supposing the preceding line of reasoning goes through, I argue that Oliver Crisp’s thesis about the imago Dei is mistaken, provided that it relies on a metaphysics of human persons that deploys an identity relation between a person and her concrete human nature or else some essential component of her concrete human nature.
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Notes
I set aside discussion of the sort of constitution metaphysics deployed by Lynne Rudder Baker, et al. I do so because I find those views to be shot through with philosophical problems, which would be the subject of an entirely separate paper. I’ve discussed her view in (Turner 2014). For Baker’s constitution view see, among others, (Baker 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007a, b). See also (Corcoran 1999). For various arguments against constitution metaphysics see, among others, (Turner 2014; Olson 1999, 2001).
This is quoted verbatim from (Jaeger 2017, 147). I have refrained from using quotation marks in this instance for style purposes. Note that this is Jaeger’s principle; it’s a principle that is stronger than the standard necessity of identity, viz., if x = y, then necessarily, x = y. A referee worries that this stronger principle might not be true; or else that I need to defend this (NI) claim. Now, (NI) isn’t mine; dialectically I have no stake in whether it’s true or false. But, for argument, I assume that it is true. In Jaeger’s defense, I take it that he assumes that the stronger principle, (NI), is true because of S5. For, if x is possibly necessarily identical to y, then necessarily x is identical to y. The clumsiness of this way of phrasing (NI) is, of course, an example of why S5 is popular in modal logic. For one thing, if identity is a necessary relation, then “necessarily identical” is redundant; for another, on S5, possibly necessary entails necessary. For a defense of S5, it’s helpful to start with (Garson 2018). But none of this need detain us. For, the arguments that follow in this paper assume the logic granted by the dialectic into which I’m stepping. Jaeger’s (NI) might be false. My main aim in this paper isn’t to render a verdict on this matter. It’s to show, instead, what else follows from Jaeger’s already published argument. In any case, I trust that those parties involved in this literature accept (NI) and S5 modal logic. I confirmed this with Oliver Crisp, for example, in personal conversation.
Brian Leftow (2002) argues that there’s a symmetry between the abstract-nature view of the incarnation and concrete-nature view, such that one only occurs if the other does. But, he suggests, the concrete nature view is basic because the abstract nature view occurs only “by concrete nature incarnation” (278–279).
(OP) borrows from Jaeger, though he does not call it “One Person (OP)” and (OP) specifies things not spelled out in Jaeger. But I take it that this is consistent with what he means. I follow him too in thinking that this is affirmed in Anathema 4 of Constantinople II (the Fifth Ecumenical Council). See Jaeger (2017, 147).
I’ll not offer and theories about how the Incarnation works or how the Logos could become human. I leave that for others.
Thanks to Jordan Wessling and Oliver Crisp for highlighting this point on an earlier draft.
Again, this is verbatim; but I’ve dropped the quotation marks for style.
For purposes of this paper, assume that I hold the (rather common) theological axiom that the Incarnate Logos is not a human person; rather, He’s a divine person with a human nature. If that’s correct—a position, again, I assume for this paper—then ‘person’ in (IV) does not, and cannot, refer to the Logos. (IV) concerns persons who are human persons.
Thanks to Ryan Mullins for this turn of phrase in personal correspondence.
This ended up ruling out the Alexandrian—even Apollinarian—“Logos-sarx” view. Cf. (Pannenberg 1968, 288; Grillmeier 1987, 101–102). But as Crisp (2007, 38 note 7) notes, things may have been a little more complex than this. Apollinarius may have affirmed the presence of a soul distinct from the Logos in the human nature of Christ. If so, he denied that Christ’s human soul had a mind and will distinct from the Logos; thus the Logos took the place of the mind and will in the soul of Christ.
There may well be other theological problems with this generic souls view of the Incarnation, too. See (Crisp 2007, 53ff) for a helpful discussion.
Again, I leave discussion of Baker-style constitution metaphysics aside. Again, this view is one I’ve tackled in (Turner 2014).
I borrow this analogy from an anonymous reviewer who read a previous draft of this essay.
By a “natural kind” I mean something synonymous to what Lynne Rudder Baker (1999, 2002, 2007a, b) calls a “primary kind,” wherein a “primary kind” or “natural kind” is a substance sortal marking the distinctions between kinds of substances by their respective essential properties. “Natural kind” has been used this way elsewhere in the literature. See, for example, Brown (2005, 169ff). Other similar uses of the term “natural kind” appear in the work of Moreland and Rae (2000, 73ff), Rosenkrantz (2012), Brower (2012), Wiggins (1976), and others.
According Pawl’s analysis, persons aren’t even kinds of supposits/hypostases. Rather, persons are accidents predicated of supposits/hypostases. Here I confess mild confusion as to how Pawl thinks of a hypostasis/supposit. For he suggests that “X is a supposit (hypostasis) if and only if x is a complete being, incommunicable by identity, not apt to inhere in anything, and not sustained by anything” (Pawl 2016, 32). This, though, is exactly how I understand a substance. In other words, these necessary and sufficient conditions read to me as follows: “X is a hypostasis if and only if it’s a substance.” It’s not clear to me whether Pawl means that a hypostasis is a particular kind of substance or if it’s just another name for a substance. For the purposes of this paper, I take it that substance/hypostasis/supposit can be used interchangeably. The important point is that, on Pawl’s view (and Flint’s, in so far as he offers a thesis like (AT*)), person is neither a kind of hypostasis nor a kind of substance; it’s an accident predicated of a hypostasis/substance, a contingent way in which a particular hypostasis/substance exists. I leave aside whether Flint or Pawl are, in fact, committed to a view like (AT*). Christopher Brown (2005, 168ff) suggests, too, that Aquinas might categorize natural kinds as a substance sortal as opposed to a phase sortal. What Flint and Pawl provide, though, and to which I’m offering my criticism, is that “being a person” is a phase-sortal of a substance rather than a kind of substance.
I note here that it seems to me that these Flintian/Pawline (not to be confused with Pauline!) views are consistent with Baker-style constitution accounts. But see note 2. Thanks to Jordan Wessling who provided some important feedback to help me clarify this point.
Jaeger (2017, 148) likewise deploys this sort of reasoning about the Incarnation.
An anonymous referee wonders if Crisp has in mind a kind of “fitness” for hypostatic union latent in individual human natures rather than a “probability” for an individual human’s hypostatic union. Here the referee points to Thomas Aquinas’s explication of “fitness” vis-à-vis a human nature’s being assumed by the Logos in the Incarnation in (Aquinas 1952a, III.Q4.a1). Here I confess mild confusion as to the nature of Thomas’s argument in this Question. But, whatever it is, suppose Crisp has it in mind. If so, I cannot see how it gets around my worries provided that Crisp holds an (IV) understanding of human persons. For, if Crisp affirms (IV) and that hypostatic union just is a relation that results only in one person, my arguments imply that the hypostatic union of another concrete nature to the Logos other than the one he in fact has is impossible. I am not at all sure what it would mean to say that a substance, S, has a fitness for some relation, R, and that R isn’t a possible relation for S. See the lines of reasoning leading up to note 7 of this article.
By “historically were generated” I mean, generated by Church Fathers when attempting to clarify orthodox Christology. There is some debate, however, whether any such clear distinctions were in the writings of the Fathers. For competing views see, for example, (Crisp 2007, 73 note 2; Mullins 2015, 6; Flint 2016, 185–187; Shults 1996; Lang 1998). Ivor Davidson thinks that one can begin to see such distinctions assumed by Cyril of Alexandria and the council at Chalcedon (which framed the so-called Definition of Chalcedon in 451). See (Davidson 2001, 139–140).
I assume, without argument, the traditional claim that the Apostle Paul wrote the Letter to the Colossians. Nothing of any importance (in this paper, anyway) rides on this.
My insert.
For some recent exegetes advancing this view, see (Middleton 2014, 45ff; Middleton 2005, 89ff; Beale 2004, 68ff; Walton 2015, 104–127; Enns 2012, 72ff). For at least one systematician sensitive to this understanding of the imago Dei, see (Fergusson 2007, 74–75). Here I take the points of Joshua Farris and Oliver Crisp, both of whom are wont to argue that the functions of the image bearer presuppose a particular kind of ontology. In which case, literature supposing that ontological notions of the imago Dei are mutually exclusive of functional notions (or relational notions) is mistaken (Farris 2017, 35; Crisp 2016, 59–60). I agree with this shared insight.
For some interesting discussion on what the texts mine mean when they say that the knowledge of God and His glory might fill the earth as the waters cover the sea, see (Levenson 1984, 289–290).
This paper was researched and written in part while I worked on the Analytic Theology Project at Fuller Theological Seminary. This project was funded by The John Templeton Foundation. My thanks to my colleagues on the project who read various drafts of this essay: James Arcadi, Oliver Crisp, Jesse Gentile, Steven Nemes, Jordan Wessling, and Christopher Woznicki. My thanks also to Ryan Mullins and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on a previous draft of this essay.
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Turner, J.T. Identity, incarnation, and the imago Dei. Int J Philos Relig 88, 115–131 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-019-09716-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-019-09716-z