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Perceptions of Philosophical Inquiry: a Survey

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Abstract

Six hundred three people completed a survey measuring perceptions of traditional areas of philosophical inquiry and their relationship to empirical science. The ten areas studied were: aesthetics, epistemology, ethics, history of philosophy, logic, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of science, and political philosophy. For each area, participants rated whether it is currently central to philosophy (centrality), whether its centrality depends on integration with science (dependence), and whether work in the area is sufficiently integrated with science (integration). Centrality judgments tended to be high. Participants viewed nine of the ten areas as central to philosophy (the exception being aesthetics), although they made this judgment more confidently for some areas. Dependence judgments were more varied, ranging from clear disagreement (for logic and history of philosophy) to clear agreement (for philosophies of science, mind, and language). Integration judgments were also varied but exhibited more uncertainty. Some areas whose centrality depended on integration were judged to be well integrated (philosophies of science and mind), but a central tendency for all other areas was ambivalence. Demographic factors had small but statistically significant effects on all three sorts of judgment. Higher age predicted higher centrality judgments and higher integration judgments. Higher socioeconomic status predicted lower dependence judgments and higher integration judgments. Men recorded higher integration judgments.

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Notes

  1. For the integration scale, two participants recorded only nine responses. Initially I overlooked these two missing responses when inspecting the data set. Instead of recalculating all of the earlier statistics and analyses, I simply retained the data from these two participants.

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Correspondence to John Turri.

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Turri, J. Perceptions of Philosophical Inquiry: a Survey. Rev.Phil.Psych. 7, 805–816 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0285-9

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