Abstract
Analytic philosophy has recently been challenged from a perspective advocated by Richard Rorty: this favours edifying philosophy against systematic philosophy comprising also analytic philosophy. In Rorty's presentation analytic philosophy is one more variant of the Cartesian—Kantian epistemology which, being committed to a permanent framework of inquiry rooted in our human subjectivity, implies the uniqueness of one conceptual scheme.
Against this tenet I argue in two ways. First, I show that analytic philosophy of mind and language with the Fregean background and possible world semantics implies the pluralism of conceptual schemes on logical-conventionalist grounds. Secondly, I show that although analytic philosophy shares the claim for legitimation of a conceptual scheme with Kantian epistemology, it is critical of the latter in that the uniqueness-claim is refuted.
In connection with legitimation the relation of analytic philosophy to scepticism is also discussed.
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Ujvári, M. Analytic philosophy challenged. Scepticism and arguing transcendentally. Erkenntnis 39, 285–304 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01128505
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01128505