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Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games

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Abstract

For strategic communication games à la Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50:1431–1451, 1982) the paper shows that under some prior beliefs different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size.

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  1. Dipartimento di Statistica, Università di Milano-Bicocca, via Bicocca degli Arcimboldi 8, 20126, Milan, Italy

    Irene Valsecchi

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  1. Irene Valsecchi
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Correspondence to Irene Valsecchi.

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Valsecchi, I. Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games. Theory Decis 74, 31–53 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9326-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9326-3

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