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An Epistemic Defense of Animism

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Animism and Philosophy of Religion

Part of the book series: Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion ((PFPR))

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Abstract

Contrary to theistic belief, the epistemic status of animistic belief is rarely discussed in contemporary philosophy of religion. I argue that animistic experiences can provide personal justification to subjects in the absence of defeating counterevidence. I also argue that recent, scientific attempts at explaining animistic experiences do not provide such counterevidence. Finally, I investigate if animistic belief can be justified on moral grounds.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    A notable exception is Tiddy Smith’s recent defense of the existence of nature spirits (Smith, 2020).

  2. 2.

    I discuss a moral-epistemic argument in Sect. 11.

  3. 3.

    For a recent over view, see (Craig & Moreland, 2009).

  4. 4.

    See, for example, (Rutten, 2014).

  5. 5.

    Often philosophers of religion argue for (or against) a perfect being (a being that is all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing etc.). This concept of God also fits well with the traditional Christian concept of God.

  6. 6.

    See, for example, (Street, 2006; Wilkins & Griffiths, 2013).

  7. 7.

    This form of Spiritism gained popularity near the end of the nineteenth century. Adherents held séances in which they invoked spirits or tried to communicate to spirits through material means (e.g. Ouija boards). Notable figures in the spiritist movement were Allan Kardec, Frans Mesmer and the Leah sisters.

  8. 8.

    Cf. (Hornborg, 2006; Stanford & Jong, 2019).

  9. 9.

    The kami that govern rivers and stream are called ‘Kawanokami’ or ‘Kahaku’ (Nakayama, 2005).

  10. 10.

    A considerable number of animists do hold that a spirit can be disentangled from its body. Nonetheless they are usually embodied.

  11. 11.

    Regarding animals or objects as spirited can be regarded as analogous to Platonist accounts where souls are the essence of persons and are separable from bodies. They can also be regarded as analogous to Aristotelian accounts where body and soul jointly make out personhood and are not separable.

  12. 12.

    For a recent account of what it means to have a soul, see (Swinburne, 2019).

  13. 13.

    Aristotle had a similar view. He argues that animals have a soul that allows them to engage in a number of activities (most notably self-directed motion). Contrary to humans they do not have a rational soul and thus miss out on most distinctively human capacities.

  14. 14.

    New animism has been defended by a number of authors (see Hallowell, 2010; Harvey, 2014). Viveiros de Castro defends a similar position he calls “perspectivist cosmology” (De Castro, 1998). In this section, I focus on Nurit Bird-David’s defense.

  15. 15.

    Bird-David even suggests that Tylor was inspired by modernist spiritualism (see above) and their beliefs on spirits. He notes that Tylor took his notion of animism from seventeenth-century alchemist Stahl.

  16. 16.

    Bird-David objects to calling the performances rituals, but calls them “practices” instead (Bird-David, 1999).

  17. 17.

    Bird-David uses the Nayaka term ‘Devaru’ to designate spirits.

  18. 18.

    See (American Psychiatric Association & American Psychiatric Association. Task Force on DSM-IV, 1994).

  19. 19.

    Lycan also suggests defining tacit beliefs as beliefs without representation (Lycan, 1986). This definition presupposes a representationalist view on belief (cf. Schwitzgebel, 2006). Delving into the discussion between representationalists and other accounts of belief stretches beyond the scope of this chapter. For this reason, I will not pursue Lycan’s suggestion any further.

  20. 20.

    The aboutness of beliefs is often called ‘intentionality’.

  21. 21.

    The content could also be assessed as accurate, meaning closer to the truth, or inaccurate, meaning further away from the truth.

  22. 22.

    See, for example, (Shermer, 2002).

  23. 23.

    For a recent similar argument, see (Rosenberg, 2020).

  24. 24.

    For a critique, see (Peels, 2013).

  25. 25.

    A widely discussed problem states that experiences lack conceptual structure and therefore cannot justify beliefs that do (Sellars, 1956).

  26. 26.

    See (Huemer, 2007).

  27. 27.

    See, for example, (Zagzebski, 1996).

  28. 28.

    Examples are (Law, 2016; Nola, 2013, 2018). For a reply, see (Van Eyghen, 2020).

  29. 29.

    The defender could of course deny the second part and insist that dreams are good guides to reality.

  30. 30.

    Jeffrey Bednark and Elisabeth Franz provide additional evidence for a proneness toward these misattributions of agency (Bednark & Franz, 2014).

  31. 31.

    Alexander Rosenberg makes a similar point when he accuses the theory of mind of promiscuously anthropomorphizing nearly everything. Like Bering, Rosenberg does not really argue for why the ToM is making mistakes when it anthropomorphizes objects or animals (Rosenberg, 2020).

  32. 32.

    Richard Swinburne indeed argues that religious experiences have evidential force for others because testimony ought to be regarded as trustworthy in the absence of reasons to doubt it (Swinburne, 2004). There seems to be no reason why his argument cannot be applied to testimony of animistic experiences as well. One potential reason to doubt that testimony of animistic experiences is equally forceful is that animistic experiences might be less ubiquitous than religious experiences. A proper assessment of this lies beyond the scope of this chapter.

  33. 33.

    See (Gardiner, 2018) for a criticism of moral encroachment.

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  1. Department of Systematic Theology and Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands

    Hans Van Eyghen

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  1. Philosophy, University of Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia

    Tiddy Smith

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Van Eyghen, H. (2023). An Epistemic Defense of Animism. In: Smith, T. (eds) Animism and Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Frontiers in Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94170-3_12

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