Abstract
This paper reflects on the idea of ‘visualization’ of legal rules as part of an account of rule following in action. Presenting an alternative to Van Schooten’s (Jurisprudence and communication. Deborah Charles, Liverpool, 2012) account of interpretation, I first distinguish between two modes of interpretation: rehearsing and discursive. I argue that the former is the more basic one, relating to our respecting sources, rather than noticing signs, in action. In other (Wittgensteinian) words, we have to understand how we take guidance from rules. This account can profit from an analysis of what ‘seeing’ amounts to. Taking my cue from Merleau-Ponty, I point to the intertwinement between agent and world in seeing, in rule-following, and eventually in legal rule-following. The proof of the pudding is an alternative account of the time-honoured paradigm of legal interpretation: Hart’s ‘no vehicles in the park’. I show how this example is predicated on detecting ‘depth-clues’ in a rule, which allow an agent to correlate his vantage point to a vanishing point of a rule. The example illustrates a key-feature of rule following: reflexivity. I cannot follow a rule unless I project myself into its picture.
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Notes
See my [11–13]. The present paper has some overlap with chapter V of the latter; and with a more technical paper ‘Rules as Icons. Wittgenstein’s Paradox and the Law’, in Ratio Juris 26 (4) 2013, pp. 538–559. I thank the editor of Ratio Juris as well as Blackwell Publishing and Edward Elgar Publishing for permission to use parts of these writings here in constructing a new argument. I thank Mrs Phyllis Lewis for copy-editing this text.
I am indebted to my colleague from Groningen, Anne Ruth Mackor, who convinced me that farmers may do like cooks rather than meteorologists in looking at clouds.
[7, p. 177]: ‘[…] il faut que celui qui regarde ne soit pas lui-même étranger au monde qu’il regarde.’ (And passim in the chapter Entrelacs—le chiasme). Note that different languages use different sensorial metaphors for confirming understanding: visual—‘I see’ (Eng.); audile—‘J’entend’ (Fr.); tactile—‘Capisco’ (It.).
Sometimes embedded in cultural practices like language. E.g., native speakers of tonal languages like Chinese perform far better than average when it comes to absolute pitch (ear).
So I concur with Van Schooten [10, p.49] (and Jackson’s) emphasis on the importance of causal, psychological, and cultural factors in the construction of ‘semiotic groups’.
For an excellent survey of the discussion see Schauer [9].
As Kafka [5] reminds us in the short story ‘Vor dem Gesetz’: ‘‘Vor dem Gesetz steht ein Türhüter. Zu diesem Türhüter kommt ein Mann vom Lande und bittet um Eintritt in das Gesetz. Aber der Türhüter sagt, daß er ihm jetzt den Eintritt nicht gewähren könne. Der Mann überlegt und fragt dann, ob er also später werde eintreten dürfen. « Es ist möglich » , sagt der Türhüter, « jetzt aber nicht.»” .
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van Roermund, B. Following Legal Rules: Visibility and Feasibility. Int J Semiot Law 27, 485–494 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-013-9355-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-013-9355-4