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Kant and Moral Demandingness

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Abstract

We discuss the demandingness of Kant’s ethics. Whilst previous discussions of this issue focused on imperfect duties, our first aim is to show that Kantian demandingness is especially salient in the class of perfect duties. Our second aim is to introduce a fine-grained picture of demandingness by distinguishing between different possible components of a moral theory which can lead to demandingness: (i) a required process of decision making, (ii) overridingness and (iii) the stringent content of demands, due to a standpoint of moral purity. This distinction allows a specification of the sources of demandingness in Kant. The most characteristically Kantian form of demandingness springs from overridingness and purity and comes as a constant threat that an agent might find herself in a situation in which, due to no fault of her own, she is required to sacrifice everything for little to no non-moral goods. Our third aim is to discuss whether Kant has the resources to reply to those who criticize his ethics based on its demandingness. For this purpose we discuss Kant’s notion of “rationalizing” (Vernünfteln) in the context of various types of current conceptions of demandingness and calls for moderate ethical theories.

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Notes

  1. See Vogt (2008), Timmermann (2005), Herman (2007, ch.9, and 12) and esp. Sherman (1997, 331).

  2. See Timmermann (2006) on the normative status of indirect duties.

  3. See. n. 1.

  4. This question is obviously central to assess the demandingness of imperfect duties. Prominent positions are Cummiskey’s (1990, sec.7) “Spartan” interpretation, according to which imperfect duties to others are highly demanding, and Hill’s (1971) latitudinarian reading, according to which an agent only has to further obligatory ends at least sometimes. Crucial passages for the debate are VI:48.17–49.5, 72.2–34, 390–3, 409.13–9, 451.6–19. See Baron (1995, ch.3) for careful discussion of all of these passages and a position in between Cummiskey and Hill.

  5. We follow Scheffler’s use of “stringent” as pertaining to the content of a moral demand. Note that Raz (1999), for example, uses “stringency” to denote Scheffler’s second aspect.

  6. For Kant the issue of scope is linked to the status of adiaphora – see VI:23n., 222.35–223.17, 409.13–19, XXVII.512.14–29.

  7. See also IV:404.8–36, VI:14.10, 84.13–4, 181.30–32, 273.16–7, VII:200.5–30, VIII:402.13–4, XXVII.127–8.

  8. See also IV:421.24–423.35, V:27.22, 36.4–6, 44.2–3, 69.22–24.

  9. For more on Kant’s conception of pre-philosophical moral awareness and how this conception relates to Kant’s philosophy see Sticker (Educating the Common Agent – Kant on the Varieties of Moral Education. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, forthcoming a, sec.1; and How can Common Rational Capacities Confirm the Correctness of the Deduction in Groundwork III – and Why does it Matter?. Hegel Bulletin, forthcoming b). A complete picture of Kant’s notion of ordinary reasoning also has to take into account the role of conscience, a rational capacity of self-scrutiny (VI:186.10–11). Discussing conscience would add further textual evidence to our claim that Kant was very optimistic concerning common rational agent’s awareness of duty. See Timmermann (2006) for more on conscience.

  10. Parfit (2011, 294), for instance, calls Kant’s insistence on the self-evidence of duty an “overstatement”.

  11. For a critical discussion of the value of universality and an unversalization procedure in moral deliberation see pars pro toto O’Neill (1975, ch.5), Herman (1993, 136–143).

  12. For another example see V:155.23–156.20. It could be objected that the deposit example indicates that Kant’s envisioned decision procedure might be not as simple as Kant thought, since returning the deposit does not seem to be obviously the right thing to do. We cannot here critically assess the great confidence Kant had in the moral-epistemological capacities of ordinary rational agents.

  13. The term “Silencing” is taken from McDowell (1998, 90–1). Note that his account might differ from the Kantian use of “zum Schweigen bringen” in two ways: Firstly, McDowell is using it in a virtue ethical framework, i.e. as indicating a harmonious state between morality and prudence in which moral violations lose attraction for an agent with a virtuous disposition. The Kantian concept of Silencing does not necessarily involve this harmony. Secondly, McDowell (1998, 93) does not believe “that any moral reason, however weak, silences any reasons of other sorts, however strong”.

  14. See V:110.31–111.5, and on Silencing V:86.22–29, XXIX:607.15–18.

  15. The best example for the attempt to blackmail an agent into doing something immoral is the Gallows Case in the remark to §6 of the Second Critique.

  16. That overridingness can be accepted independently of claims concerning the content of moral claims is highlighted by the fact that some critics of overridingness take moral demands to have a stringent content and argue that they therefore should not be overriding (e.g. Foot 1978, see Scheffler 1992, 57–60), or that they should be overriding but not stringent (Stroud 1998).

  17. See Timmermann (2013, sec.5) for more.

  18. Exemplary casuistical discussions of duties encompass perfect (VI:423.18–424.8, 426.1–32), and imperfect duties (VI:454.1–21), as well as more general questions (VI:454.22–8, 458.12–9).

  19. All of these five points touch on complex issues and deserve more detailed discussion than we can provide. Our aim is here merely to defend the standard view that even though Kant acknowledges that human beings are finite, the duties these beings have do not hinge on their personal preferences or projects. It is noteworthy that all points except the first are only discussed in detail in Kant’s post-Second Critique writings, i.e., they are not part of Kant’s foundational thoughts on ethics. We are grateful to two anonymous referees for discussion.

  20. One might argue that not getting something that one is contractually entitled to is already a negative consequence. The deposit case is, however, constructed in such a way that this consequence would in no way infringe on the well-being of the rightful heirs – handing over the deposit “would be equivalent to throwing it into the sea” (VIII:286.28–9). We are grateful to a referee for pressing us on this point.

  21. It is common in the Kant literature to discuss the murderer at the door in the context of ethical duties – see for instance O’Neill (1975, 133), Korsgaard (1996, ch.5).

  22. See Korsgaard (1996, ch.5), Sherman (1997, 320–325) for a charitable reading of the liar case.

  23. See V:35.16–36.8, 155.12–18.

  24. See V:152.9–11, VI:36.1–7, 321–322fn., 355.3–6.

  25. For more on rationalizing see Guyer (2000), Piper (2008), Sticker (Educating the Common Agent – Kant on the Varieties of Moral Education. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, forthcoming a, sec.2.3).

  26. That inclinations are desires for pleasure and that Kant had a simplistic, pleasure and pain based conception of happiness and non-moral practical rationality is sometimes argued by Kantians (Beck 1960, 92–102) and assumed by authors critical of Kant (Foot 1978, 158–9, 165). Some passages in Kant support this picture A/B:806/834, V:22–3.

  27. Note, that later Raz (1999, 303) seems to have given up the distinction between well-being (interests) and self-interest and that Wallace and Raz differ, because Wallace takes the conflict to be one of context independent sets of considerations.

  28. Reath (2006, ch.2) argues with great ingenuity that it is mistaken to attribute a “hedonistic psychology” (ibid.33) to Kant.

  29. See VI:224.9–24, and Timmermann (2013).

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Acknowledgments

We are grateful to Liz Ashford, Marcia Baron, Susanne Boshammer, Martin Brecher, Christine Chwaszcza, André Grahle, Matthias Hoesch, Nikola Kompa, Bren Markey, Brian McElwee, James McGuiggan, Felix Pinkert, Leonard Randall, Joe Saunders, Joe Slater, Jens Timmermann, Katja Vogt and anonymous referees for feedback on earlier drafts of this paper and discussion of Kant and demandingness. We are grateful to the Universities of St Andrews, Stirling and Osnabrück for the opportunity to present earlier versions of this paper as well as our audiences at these occasions for their helpful feedback. Furthermore we thank the participants of two seminars on the topic at the University of Münster.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophisches Seminar, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität, Domplatz 6, 48143, Münster, Germany

    Marcel van Ackeren

  2. Departments of Philosophy, University of St Andrews, Edgecliffe, The Scores, St Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, UK

    Martin Sticker

  3. Stirling Department, University of Stirling, Pathfoot Building, Stirling, FK9 4LA, UK

    Martin Sticker

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Correspondence to Marcel van Ackeren.

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Translations from the Groundwork are from the Timmermann (2011) translation. Other works by Kant are quoted, with occasional modifications, from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Kant is quoted according to the standard Academy Edition (volume:page.line). The First Critique is quoted according to the A/B editions.

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van Ackeren, M., Sticker, M. Kant and Moral Demandingness. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 18, 75–89 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9510-3

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