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Subjective consciousness and self-representation

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, USA

    Robert Van Gulick

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  1. Robert Van Gulick
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Correspondence to Robert Van Gulick.

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Van Gulick, R. Subjective consciousness and self-representation. Philos Stud 159, 457–465 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-011-9765-7

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