Abstract
Whether perception involves the manipulation of representations is currently heavily debated. The embedded view (EV) advanced by Nico Orlandi seeks a middle passage between representationalism and radical enactivism. In this paper I argue for a non-representational take on EV. I argue that this is the best way to resolve the objections EV has received from both representationalists and non-representationalists. I analyze this debate, and distinguish four sorts of objections: (1) the objection of the wrongfully cut middleman, (2) the argument against explanatory exclusionism, (3) the case for scientific benefits of representations, and (4) the charge of inconsistent ascription of representational status in EV. I argue that (1) the middleman was never cut in EV, and is controversial to boot, (2) otherwise equal, non-representational explanations have primacy over representational explanations, due to the lack of naturalistic grounds for representations and the unnecessarily ascribed cognitive load to the system. Further, I show that (3) puts the cart before the horse, and the arguments on offer are viciously circular. However, the final objection, (4) lays bare a deeper issue for EV. At the cost of giving up the middle position, however, the explanatory tools already available to EV can be shown to cover the work initially thought to require representation. I conclude that EV is best altered to be a non-representational theory of perception.
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Notes
The textbook interpretation of Marr is representational, but it is up for debate whether this is the only interpretation (Orlandi, 2014, note 3).
In both instances there is an incredible variation of theories, and though some certainly find themselves more in one camp than another, a certain degree of fluidity between these camps exists.
I think the name ‘representation wars’ stems from Clark (2015).
Predictive processing (see Hohwy 2013; Clark 2016 for some good introductory monographs) is one such theory, in which the rules are thought to be represented in the form of generative models. Some recent takes on the theory however, advocate a non-representational reading (Kirchhoff and Robertson 2018; Bruineberg et al. 2018; Hutto 2017).
This is not to say that content is all it takes for a relation to be representational, only that it is minimally necessary.
This excludes deflationary notions of representation. In this paper, representations are minimally required to have content, as to not over-generate representations or ascribe them too liberally (see also Ramsey 2007).
As we shall see below, I think this portrayal of Orlandi’s position is incorrect.
Mole and Zhao (2016) argue roughly that the subjects in the experiments have become sensitive to newfound statistical regularities in the environment, so that they could not have been hardwired. With a hidden assumption that systems can only become sensitive to new statistical regularities with representations, they conclude that representations thus must in some cases be used in visual processing. This bypasses Orlandi’s explanation of malleability.
This is not to discredit the empirical research programme of Bayesian brain theories of perception and cognition, which seems promising (see Hohwy 2013; Clark 2016). This is a point about how to interpret the priors used in this research. There is a difference between using Bayesian models as scientists to model and predict behaviour of animals, and a realist position concerning the models used as existing in the animal’s head (or body). Rescorla (2015) favors an interpretation of the scientific literature that involves a realist position of these priors. Here I argue that doing so does not add any explanatory value.
The possibility to make mistakes is not reason to doubt this explanation. Instead, it speaks in its favor. After all, it is because we are wired to see rigid objects when encountering particular patterns of stimulation, that the system sometimes fails and we become susceptible to illusions. Complete exposition of this is outside the scope of this paper, but see Orlandi (2014, ch. 4) for a more elaborate explanation, as well as similar non-representational, embedded explanations of misperception in general and multi-stability.
See also Di Paolo et al. (2017) that explain the ‘seeing of backsides’ in terms of interactional relevance. We approach a particular object as having a backside when the backside is relevant to our current activity. A keyboard is not interacted with as having a backside currently not visible to the eye, unless we, say, pick it up. A teacup on the other hand, typically affords picking up and its backside will thus be ‘seen’ more regularly.
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Acknowledgements
This paper was funded by the FWO (Grant No. 1124818N). I am grateful to three anonymous reviewers for their helpful commentary, which greatly improved the paper. I also thank Erik Myin and Victor Loughlin for helpful discussions and comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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van Es, T. The embedded view, its critics, and a radically non-representational solution. Synthese 198 (Suppl 1), 195–211 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02385-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02385-5