Abstract
Hutto and Satne (Philosophia, 2015) review current attempts to provide a naturalized content and underline some of the most convincing reasons why they remain inadequate. The authors reframe and update Haugeland’s assessment of this research program, but besides describing the particular challenges facing the different candidate accounts, they also propose what seems to be a promising way to further a debate that has not advanced in recent years. In this paper I argue that a more detailed exploration of some aspects of the neo-behaviorist and neo-pragmatist strategies might be helpful in order to advance the discussion.
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Notes
Not all intentional states possess evident directions of fit. However, their intentionality is usually explainable in terms of the intentionality of the “ground-level” beliefs and desires that they presuppose.
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Varga, S. Intentionality, Normativity and Naturalism. Philosophia 43, 611–624 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9629-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9629-z