Abstract
A self-fulfilling fallacy (SFF) is a fallacious argument whose conclusion is that the very fallacy employed is an invalid or otherwise illegitimate inferential procedure. This paper discusses three different ways in which SFF’s might serve to justify their conclusions. SFF’s might have probative value as honest and straightforward arguments, they might serve to justify the premise of a meta-argument or, following a point made by Roy Sorensen, they might provide a non-inferential basis for accepting their conclusion. The paper concludes with an assessment of the relative merits of these proposals.
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Notes
I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this possibility.
In saying this, I do not wish to beg any important questions concerning how to define fallaciousness. My point is only that any acceptable definition should at least entail that a fallacious argument cannot honestly and straightforwardly justify belief in its conclusion.
Nuchelmans (1992) recounts an old debate over whether consequentia mirabilis is a free standing and basic inferential principle or whether it is a derivative abbreviation of reductio ad absurdum. If the latter position turns out to be more plausible, the proceeding comments can be modified without much difficulty.
Hamblin (1975) credits V. H. Dudman with devising this clever label for AEE-1 syllogisms.
Applying the principle in this context requires that we fudge around with the negations a bit. I do not take this to be a problem. It is also worth noting that the name 'consequentia mirabilis' is commonly applied both to the principle stated above as well as lex Clavii (Clavius' law) which allows us to infer the falsity of any proposition that entails its own negation: from "If P then Not-P" infer Not-P. (See Castagnoli 2010, 102).
An anonymous referee suggests that it might be simpler to state the meta-argument this way: 6.’ The assumption that Maltese reasoning is valid generates contradictions. Therefore, 7.’ Maltese reasoning is invalid. Those who think consequentia mirabilis is derivative of reductio ad absurdum (see footnote 2) will prefer this way of putting things.
See BonJour (1998) for a defense of the claim that the making probable relation holds with necessity in a good inductive argument.
See Fumerton (1995) for a good discussion.
See Jacquette (1996).
This paper was presented at the 2010 meeting of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation in Amsterdam and at the 2011 meeting of the North Carolina Philosophical Society in Boone. I thank John Collins, A. J. Kreider, Jeremy Morris, Len Olsen, Michael Pendlebury, David Robb, Roy Sorensen and two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Appendix
Appendix
More fun with SFF’s:
One of my friends from grad school flunked out of the program because he relied on anecdotal evidence.
I got refuted right after I used a post hoc ergo propter hoc argument.
Fallacies of composition don’t have valid premises and they don’t have valid conclusions. And those are the only parts that an argument has.
Either false dilemma arguments are fallacious or you’re a nitwit.
Over the years, my students have offered many arguments relying on biased samples and all of those arguments had false conclusions.
There was this one time when I relied on an inductive argument with a small sample and I ended up being wrong. I’ll never do that again.
Once you let slippery slope arguments slide you end up allowing every fallacy in the book.
The problem with strawman arguments is that they don’t have premises or conclusions.
Well, you’ve never seen any proof that argumentum ad ignorantum is valid have you?
Weak analogies are just like terrorism.
If there are no counterexamples to denying the antecedent then it’s valid. But there are so it isn’t.
The error in ad hoc reasoning can be explained by appeal to a principle designed for just that purpose.
Since most people’s desires and wishes are base, selfish, depraved and immoral, it would be really nice if the fallacy of wishful thinking were an unreliable inference.
A mere assertion does not prove anything.
Driver’s licenses, coupons, etc. are valid whenever the expiration date has not been reached. But arguments don’t even have expiration dates; so arguments from equivocation aren’t valid.
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Veber, M. “People Who Argue Ad Hominem Are Jerks” and Other Self-Fulfilling Fallacies. Argumentation 26, 201–212 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9230-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-011-9230-y