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A soul of truth in things erroneous: Popper’s “amateurish” evolutionary philosophy in light of contemporary biology

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Abstract

This paper will critically assess Popper’s evolutionary philosophy. There exists a rich literature on the topic with which we have many reservations. We believe that Popper’s evolutionary philosophy should be assessed in light of the intriguing theoretical insights offered, during the last 10 years or so, by the philosophy of biology, evolutionary biology and molecular biology. We will argue that, when analysed in this manner, Popper’s ideas concerning the nature of selection, Lamarckism and the theoretical limits of neo-Darwinism can be appreciated in their full biological and philosophical value.

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Notes

  1. Distinguishing Popper’s ideas in four phases is a methodological strategy that only partially matches the chronology of his intellectual development. For instance, the fourth phase partially overlaps with the third. Hence, when we try to characterise the different phases conceptually rather than chronologically, this is not meant to imply that there are no conceptual overlaps between them. For instance, treating Darwinism as a metaphysical research programme is not incompatible with considering it explanatorily incomplete.

  2. For an analysis of the relationships between these two classes of statements in Popper’s philosophy of science see Stamos (1996, p. 179).

  3. It is tendentious because it makes reference to the teleological terminology of foresight and choice that many contemporary Lamarckians (Jablonka and Lamb 1995, 2006; Koonin 2012) would reject as illegitimate.

  4. The notion of plastic control is analogous to that of “vicarious selector” (Campbell 1974a) and “heuristic” (Stein and Lipton 1989), that is, a bias or constraint on variation generation whose function is to reduce the costs of totally unbiased and chaotic exploration.

  5. He was therefore correctly criticised by Lewontin (1982).

  6. Throughout his evolutionary writings (e.g. Popper 1972, p. 149) Popper clearly makes reference to the idea of niche construction (Odling-Smee et al. Odling and J., Laland K. N., Feldman M. W., 2003). Thus, the dialectical model of evolution, proposed by Lewontin (1982) as an alternative to trial and error, is partially present in Popper’s mature biophilosophy.

  7. Weber and Depew (2003). For instance, Mayr noticed that there are no birds with crests that do not have the ability to raise it, possibly meaning that the behaviour for controlling the raising of the crest temporally preceded and caused the emergence of the morphological trait (West-Eberhard 2003, p.181).

  8. West-Eberhard (2007), however, considers the endorsement of a Lamarckian stance totally unnecessary and misleading.

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Acknowledgments

We thank David Miller, Michael Bradie and Maurizio Esposito for very helpful suggestions and comments. DV acknowledges the financial support of the Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Científico y Tecnológico de Chile (Grant N. 11110409). LB would like to thank Fapesp—Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (Grant N. 2010/17862-7).

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Vecchi, D., Baravalle, L. A soul of truth in things erroneous: Popper’s “amateurish” evolutionary philosophy in light of contemporary biology. HPLS 36, 525–545 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40656-014-0047-5

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