Abstract
Yitzhak Benbaji argues that those combatants who have agreed to blindly obey their superiors and who are ordered to fight in unjust wars are released from their duty to deliberate about the merits of the acts that they are ordered to perform. This is because their agreements result in the combatants’ permissible lack of a necessary capacity for moral responsibility. Thus, the combatants are not morally responsible for their wrongful acts—their moral responsibility is “transferred” to their superiors. We argue, first, that Benbaji’s own reasoning suggests that the agreements entered into between the combatants and their superiors are not binding and, second, that even if such agreements are binding, those combatants who obey their orders to fight are nevertheless morally responsible for their wrongful acts. Thus, Benbaji has failed to show that the combatants are permitted to act as ordered. By critically examining Benbaji’s view, then, we defend the revisionist position that just and unjust combatants are morally unequal.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Unless explicitly indicated, we will use moral notions in the fact-relative sense.
A related view, although much less developed, is put forward by Walzer (2004, ch. 2).
McMahan develops the moral responsibility account in McMahan (2005, 394–404) as well as in several other essays. Other defenders of the moral responsibility account include Gordon-Solmon (2018), Otsuka (1994). It should be noted that McMahan’s understanding of the notion of moral responsibility is different than the general concept of moral responsibility. For a discussion of this issue, see Sartorio (2021).
This is a paraphrase of the criterion as introduced in McMahan (2005, 394).
“Presumably” because, for a revisionist like McMahan, orders to fight in unjust wars can satisfy in bello norms only in exceptional circumstances. For a discussion, see McMahan (2009 15–32).
Elsewhere, however, Benbaji and Daniel Statman explain Walzer’s traditional view in terms of transferred responsibility. See Benbaji and Statman (2019, ch. 5, esp. 130–1).
We follow Benbaji in using feminine pronouns when referring to Expert and using masculine ones when referring to Assistant.
Here Benbaji relies on Jonathan Quong’s (2011, 126–31) duty-based conception of legitimate authority, which blends John Rawls’s natural duty theory with Joseph Raz’s service conception.
In another version of Special Killing, Assistant will lose sight of the rescue mission as a whole and so he will be unable to assess Expert’s orders (Benbaji, 2021, 8). Benbaji grants that this alternative version is more realistic.
Notice, however, that if Benbaji is right, both the conscientious car driver and the conscientious ambulance driver discussed by McMahan are probably fact-relative permitted to drive, even though they will end up killing innocent persons, unless those persons kill them first. The drivers’ liability to defensive killing, then, may be affected as well.
Here is one reason why one may think that the agreement is binding. The agreement is binding because, in fact, it does not obligate Assistant to act in a way that is impermissible. This is because entering into the agreement is the only way in which Victim can be saved, even if he ends up being killed as a result of it. At t2, then, Assistant engages in a risky activity that he is plausibly permitted to engage in, namely trying to save a person who otherwise will die. It is not clear, however, that Benbaji himself can avail himself of this reason and maintain his view intact.
For an illuminating discussion of “tracing,” see Fischer and Tognazzini (2009).
To make the case completely analogous to Special Killing, Driver# should harm (in fact, kill) the bar customer rather than Pedestrian#. As nothing of substance seems to depend on this particular issue, we prefer to make the case involving Driver# as similar as possible to the case involving Driver*.
The discussion of the relationship between evidence-relative justification and excuse is indebted to related remarks by McMahan. See McMahan (2009, 43, 62, 144).
References
Benbaji, Y. (2021). Costly authority and transferred responsibility. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01615-2
Benbaji, Y., & Statman, D. (2019). War by agreement. Oxford University Press.
Estlund, D. (2007). On following orders in an unjust war. Journal of Political Philosophy, 15(2), 213–234.
Fabre, C. (2012). Cosmopolitan war. Oxford University Press.
Fischer, J. M., & Tognazzini, N. A. (2009). The truth about tracing. Noûs, 43(3), 531–556.
Frowe, H. (2014). Defensive killing. Oxford University Press.
Gordon-Solmon, K. (2018). What makes a person liable to defensive harm? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97(3), 543–567.
McMahan, J. (2004). The ethics of killing in war. Ethics, 114(4), 693–733.
McMahan, J. (2005). The basis of moral liability to defensive killing. Philosophical Issues, 15, 386–405.
McMahan, J. (2009). Killing in war. Oxford University Press.
Otsuka, M. (1994). Killing the innocent in self-defense. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 23(1), 74–94.
Parry, J. (2017). Authority and harm. In D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne, & S. Wall (Eds.), Oxford studies in political philosophy (Vol. 3, pp. 252–277). Oxford University Press.
Quong, J. (2011). Liberalism without perfection. Oxford University Press.
Renzo, M. (2019). Political authority and unjust wars. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99(2), 336–357.
Rodin, D. (2002). War and self-defense. Clarendon Press.
Sartorio, C. (2021). The concept of responsibility in the ethics of self-defense and war. Philosophical Studies. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01614-3
Walzer, M. (2004). Arguing about war. Yale University Press.
Acknowledgements
We especially thank Yitzhak Benbaji for multiple comments on previous drafts, including one as referee for Philosophical Studies. We would also like to thank the second anonymous reviewer for helpful suggestions.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Venezia, L., Sánchez Brígido, R. Unjust combatants, special authority, and “transferred responsibility”. Philos Stud 179, 2187–2198 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01759-1
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01759-1