Abstract
It is possible to consider attention as the modulating dimension of consciousness. Understood in this sense, attention can be a privileged theme for relating the first person point of view (conceived as a psycho-phenomenology inspired by the work of Husserl) to the experimental sciences (e.g. psychology, neuropsychology, etc.), which have done a great deal of work on attention. This article will take up in succession some different points of view regarding the status of attention and its structure (e.g. static aspects). It will also consider the dynamic of attention from a micro-genetic point of view as well as a functional point of view. The final section will seek to show not only the unique and original contributions of each perspective, but also each perspective's limitations and biases.
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Vermersch, P. Attention between phenomenology and experimental psychology. Continental Philosophy Review 37, 45–81 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:MAWO.0000049300.54905.b7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:MAWO.0000049300.54905.b7