Abstract
This paper is a reaction to the book “Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom”, whose central concern is the philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell. I distinguish and discuss three concerns in Maxwell’s philosophy. The first is his critique of standard empiricism (SE) in the philosophy of science, the second his defense of aim-oriented rationality (AOR), and the third his philosophy of mind. I point at some problematic aspects of Maxwell’s rebuttal of SE and of his philosophy of mind and argue in favor of AOR.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
See especially Maxwell (2004)
Not all metaphysical principles can be revised in the light of theories and data, though. The principles that we find upper most in the hierarchy, namely, that the world is partially knowable and that it is meta-knowable (i.e., that we can learn how to learn), would not be affected by changes in data and theories, or by the changes in the metaphysical assumptions that such changes in data and theories could entail. Rather, they could only be affected by a continued failure to understand the world; more on this later.
Not at all like in Kuhn’s philosophy, where metaphysical principles (only of a narrow kind) are regarded as constitutive parts of paradigms and thus not part of what scientists should discuss, except during a revolution.
I think that the principles that state that we can acquire partial knowledge of the world and that we can learn how to learn about the world are indeed metaphysical presuppositions, even though the so-called cognitive/naturalistic turn in the philosophy of science purports to make them scientific claims. However, there is an element of circularity in the whole cognitive program, which probably should be supplemented by the assumption that science can provide at least partial knowledge of how we get to know about the world and learn about how to learn about it. Naturalists would reject this approach and speak about a bootstrapping strategy—we may use science to explain how science is possible—but I find it difficult to understand this bootstrapping strategy in a non-circular way.
This principle states that every physical event which has a cause has a sufficient physical cause.
More precisely, it would entail a rebuttal of a part of physicalism, at least as Maxwell understands it. For according to Maxwell, physicalism is composed of two theses: (a) that there is a true physical theory of everything; and (b) that such a theory is unified. The rejection of the CCP would amount to a rejection of thesis (a)—which is what other authors label ‘physicalism’.
Incidentally, I think that this has already been done. See the immense debate about how to define and justify physicalism or concerning the notion of emergence.
Another way to put the whole point is this: Maxwell’s idea that principles at upper levels can be revised in the light of theories and data ends up committing him to the view that, after all, science has to do only with empirical facts.
Thus, “epistemic emergentism”, as one could call it, is, as such, entirely compatible with Maxwell’s picture. In fact, Maxwell himself acknowledges that physical explanation has limits. The stance which is problematic is ontological emergentism.
In this respect, I found Cophrone McDonald’s contribution to Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom very useful; he details the kind of studies that can (and do) articulate and give content to Maxwell’s academic revolution.
A wonderful piece where this is made conspicuous is the film (and the play that inspired it) Inherit the Wind, based on the famous “Scopes Monkey Trial”. In it, Henry Drummond, the character played by Spencer Tracy, bases his defence of the teacher prosecuted for having taught evolutionary theory on the identification of science and free thinking.
In Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom, Margaret Boden gives the example of the development of Cognitive Science.
It is surely wrong to identify the Enlightenment project with empiricism, even if empiricism has been the dominant way in which (especially in the Anglo-Saxon world) the Enlightenment project has been developed. In fact, that the Enlightenment project only partially coincides with the empiricist project is what makes it possible to hold that Maxwell’s is an enlightened revolt. It is a completely rationalistic correction to the overall form the Enlightenment project has taken.
Maxwell is not a determinist. Rather, he believes in probabilistic determinism. I think this point does not carry much weight in this context.
Maxwell would put this differently: according to him, what we have to explain is not our sense of control, but control itself. The person’s self is just the control aspect of the brain. However, I take it that explaining brain-control is not the same as explaining free will. The explanation of free will seems to require that we explain how it is that our behaviour is under the control of our conscious will, that is, that our actions are brought about by our conscious deliberations and volitions as such. I am not sure about this, but it looks as though the control system Maxwell speaks about falls more on the side of the physical—broadly understood—than on the side of the mental.
Maxwell will probably think that the dilemma is unsound because there is a third option not considered, i.e. that mental and physical states are identical. This third option enables us to claim that, while mental aspects are inert, mental states are causally efficacious. But the problem is that we seem to want mental states to be causally efficacious in virtue of their mental, and not their physical, aspect. This “in virtue” problem was, in the end, the problem that caused the fall of anomalous monism, and, as I say, I see no way out for Maxwell either.
References
Bedau, M. A. (1997). Weak emergence. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical perspectives: Mind, causation, and world, 11: 375–399.
Carruthers, P. (2007). The illusion of conscious will. Synthese, 159, 197–213.
Cartwright, N. (1999). The dappled world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dar-Nimrod, I., & Heine, S. J. (2006). Exposure to scientific theories affects women’s math performance. Science, 314(5798), 435.
Davidson, D. (1993). Thinking causes. In J. Heil & A. Mele (Eds.), Mental causation. Oxford: Clarendon.
Davies, P. (2006). The physics of downward causation. In P. Davies & P. Clayton (Eds.), The re-emergence of emergence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dupré, J. (2001). Human nature and the limits of science. New York: Oxford University Press.
Friedman, M. (1974). Explanation and scientific understanding. Journal of Philosophy, 71, 5–19.
Gillett, C. (2006). Samuel Alexander’s emergentism. Synthese, 153, 261–296.
Horgan, T. (2007). Mental causation and the agent-exclusion problem. Erkenntnis, 67, 183–200.
Hornsby, J. (2004). Alienated agents. In M. De Caro & D. Macarthur (Eds.), Naturalism in question. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Kauffman, S. (1995). At home in the universe. New York: Oxford University Press.
Kim, J. (1993). Supervenience and mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kim, J. (2005). Physicalism or Something Near Enough. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Kitcher, P. (1989). Explanatory unification and the causal structure of the world. In P. Kitcher & W. Salmon (Eds.), Scientific explanation. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Kitcher, P. (2001). Science, truth and democracy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, D. (1966). An argument for the identity theory. Journal of Philosophy, 63(2), 17–25.
Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. (1983). Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain, 106, 623–642.
Maxwell, N. (1966). Physics and common sense. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 16, 295–311.
Maxwell, N. (1968). Understanding sensations. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 46, 127–146.
Maxwell, N. (2001). The human world in the physical universe: Consciousness, free will and evolution. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Maxwell, N. (2004). Is science neurotic? London: Imperial College Press.
Maxwell, N. (2010). Cutting God in half—and putting the pieces together again: A new approach to philosophy. London: Pentire.
McHenry, L. (Ed.). (2009). Science and the pursuit of wisdom: Studies in the philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.
McLaughlin, B. P. (1993). On Davidson’s response to the charge of epiphenomenalism. In J. Heil & R. Mele (Eds.), Mental causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mulligan, K., Simons, P., & Smith, B. (2006). What’s wrong with contemporary philosophy? Topoi, 25, 63–67.
Papineau, D. (2001). The rise of physicalism. In C. Gillet & B. M. Loewer (Eds.), Physicalism and its discontents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Thornhill, R., & Thornhill, N. (1983). Human rape: an evolutionary analysis. Ethology and Sociobiology, 4, 137–173.
Vicente, A. (2002). How dispositions can be causally relevant. Erkenntniss, 56, 329–344.
Vicente, A. (2006). On the causal completeness of physics. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 20, 149–171.
Vicente, A. (2009). Functions and emergence: when functional properties have something to say. Philosophical Studies. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9477-4.
Vicente, A. (2010). Current physics and the physical. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (in press).
Wegner, D. (2002). The illusion of conscious will. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Acknowledgements
Research for this paper has been funded by the Research Project FFI2008-06421-C02-02 of the Spanish Science Ministry. My gratitude to Nick Maxwell for his comments and inspiration,and to the editor of Philosophia, Asa Kasher, for inviting me to write this piece.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Vicente, A. An Enlightened Revolt: on the Philosophy of Nicholas Maxwell. Philosophia 38, 631–648 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9244-y
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-010-9244-y