Abstract
Many Christian theologians believe in the existence of cases of divine hardening and divine election, where God either actively contributes to human evil or preordains it. God seems to act like a manipulator, who first covertly incites or determines people’s evil actions and then condemns those actions and punishes the wrongdoers. I raise three questions regarding such cases: (1) how can humans be responsible for wrongdoings that are determined by God via either direct involvement or predestination; (2) is God justified in using covert manipulation to achieve his goals; (3) how can God judge human evil, if God predestines them or actively incites humans to commit evils? The article outlines two cases of supposed divine manipulation, discusses the general nature of manipulation and then examines each question outlined above. The argument is that the problems surrounding divine manipulation present significant challenges to especially those Christian theists that subscribe to divine determinism.
Zusammenfassung
Viele christliche Theologen glauben an die Existenz von Fällen göttlicher Verhärtung und göttlicher Erwählung, in denen Gott entweder aktiv menschliches Übel herbeiführt oder es verurteilt. Gott scheint wie ein Manipulator zu handeln, der Menschen zu bösen Handlungen heimlich anstiftet oder vorherbestimmt und dann diese Handlungen verurteilt und den Übeltäter bestraft. Ich erhebe drei Anfrage an diese Fälle: (1) wie können Menschen für Fehlverhalten verantwortlich gemacht werden, die von Gott entweder durch direkte Einwirkung oder durch Prädestination determiniert sind; (2) ist Gott berechtigt, durch verdeckte Manipulation seine Ziele zu erreichen; (3) wie kann Gott menschliche Übeltaten verurteilen, wenn Gott diese vorherbestimmt hat oder aktiv Menschen angestiftet hat, Böses zu begehen? Der Beitrag skizziert zwei Fälle vermeintlicher göttlicher Manipulation, diskutiert die allgemeine Natur der Manipulation und untersucht dann jede der oben umrissenen Fragen. Es wird argumentiert, dass die Probleme im Zusammenhang mit der göttlichen Manipulation erhebliche Herausforderungen darstellen, insbesondere für jene christlichen Theisten, die sich dem göttlichen Determinismus verschrieben haben.
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