The Circle of Criminal Responsibility

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The Circle of Criminal Responsibility

Juridicism in Klaus Günther’s Discourse Theory of Law

Vogelmann, Frieder

From the journal ARSP Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Volume 100, December 2014, issue 4

Published by Franz Steiner Verlag

article, 9540 Words
Original language: English
ARSP 2014, pp 413-428
https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2014-0031

Abstract

Klaus Günther’s discourse theory of law links the concept of criminal responsibility with the legitimacy of democratic law. Because attributions of criminal responsibility are always aimed at a person, they contain an implicit conception of the person. In a democracy under the rule of law, Günther argues, this conception of a person must be understood, as a “deliberative person”, a free and autonomous person capable of being both the addressee and the author of legal norms. The “deliberative person” is the conceptual core of criminal responsibility, yet Günther develops it using a concept of “communicative accountability” modeled on the concept of criminal responsibility that it is designed to explicate. My aim is to bring this circular grounding of criminal responsibility into view and argue that Günther’s discourse theory of law is based on a legalized picture of discourse.

Author information

Frieder Vogelmann